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 This dissertation is comprised of two essays on corporate bank loan contracting.  
The purpose of the first essay is to investigate the effect of loan’s designated purpose on 
loan agreement contracting terms, as well as to examine whether lenders apply different 
standards to assess the value of borrower’s corporate governance for each type of loan 
purpose.  Using a large sample of private bank loans, the results indicate that both price 
and non-price loan terms vary significantly by loan purpose.   Specifically, the spread 
yield varies by about 182 basis points (bps) for loans made for different purposes.  
Further, borrowers of operations loans (commercial paper backup, general corporate 
purpose, and working capital) are able to reduce their commitment fees by as much as 
30%.  In addition, restructure loans (acquisition line, debt repayment, leveraged buyout, 
spinoff, and takeover) are more sensitive to covenant inclusion than operations loans by 
as much as 39%.  Inclusion of sweep restriction covenants significantly reduces spread 
yield for restructure loans, while financial ratio restrictions reduce spread yield for 
operations loans.  Finally, empirical findings suggest that corporate governance for 
operations loans is significantly more influential at affecting both price and non-price 
terms of loan contracts than for restructure loans. 
viii 
 The second essay utilizes a hostile takeover framework to examine the effect of 
board busyness on corporate cost of debt.  First, the study establishes an inverse 
relationship between board busyness and firm’s hostile takeover vulnerability by 
implementing the takeover vulnerability index, which allows for study of the relationship 
ex ante.  Second, the relationship between board busyness and cost of debt is 
investigated.  The results indicate that as the level of board busyness increases, the cost of 
debt decreases.  Economically, the findings suggest that for firms whose board is 
comprised of 40% busy directors, the spread yield is about 27 bps lower than for firms 








ESSAY 1:  DOES THE PURPOSE OF A LOAN MATTER? 
EVIDENCE FROM BANK LOAN CONTRACTING 
 
 The objective of this study is to examine the relationship between loan’s 
designated purpose and loan contract agreement composition, as well as to determine the 
differential impact of corporate governance on the cost of debt for loans of different 
purposes.  Using a sample of 4,333private bank loans, we find that both price and non-
price loan terms vary significantly by loan purpose.  Specifically, our results indicate that 
spread yield varies by as much as 182 bps among loans with different purpose 
designations.  We also observe that borrowers of operations loans (i.e., CP backup, 
general purposes, and working capital) are able to reduce their upfront commitment fees 
by as much as 30%.  Restructure loans (i.e., acquisition line, debt repayment, LBO, 
spinoff, and takeover) are more sensitive to covenant inclusion than operations loans by 
as much as 39%, especially for capital raising restrictions.  Further, we determine that 
inclusion of covenants significantly reduces the spread yield, although not uniformly 
across loans of different purposes.  In addition, our results suggest that quality of 
corporate governance for operations loans borrowers is significantly more influential at 





1.  Introduction 
 Private debt financing comprises a large portion of corporate capital makeup.1  As 
a result of the heavy corporate reliance on private debt capital, a great deal of research 
has been devoted to studying how bank loan contracts are determined, including how 
factors such as borrowers’ corporate governance characteristics affect the cost of debt.2  
However, much of the extant literature on bank loan contracting applies its findings 
indiscriminately to loans of all purposes without regard to idiosyncrasies in loan structure 
and design resulting from different designated uses of loan proceeds.3  To help fill the 
void, we examine the relationship between loan’s designated purpose and loan contract 
agreement composition, as well as determine the differential impact of corporate 
governance on the cost of debt for loans of different purposes. 
 Loan contracts are comprised of both price (i.e., spread, fees) and non-price (i.e., 
covenants) terms, where each component is designed to serve specific function within the 
loan agreement.4   Several studies suggest that loans with particular designated purposes, 
such as recapitalizations, buyouts, and spinoffs (collectively referred to as restructure 
loans), have significantly higher spreads than operational loans, such as general corporate 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
1For example, in 2006, U.S. domiciled corporations raised more than $2,619 billion of new external capital, 
of which 65% consisted of private bank loans.  The data supporting these statistics come from Federal 
Reserve Bank (www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/releases /corpsecure/) and the Loan Pricing 
Corporation. 
2See, for example, Asquith, Beatty, and Weber (2005); Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan (2011); 
Demiroglu and James (2010); Dennis, Nandy, and Sharpe (2000); Gorton and Kahn (2000); Kim, Song, 
and Zhang (2011); Qian and Strahan (2007).
3 For example, although studies such as Demiroglu and James (2010), Dichev and Skinner (2002), and 
Graham, Li, and Qiu (2008), significantly extend the general understanding on the various components of 
loan contracting, they do not examine whether contract terms are determined differently for loans extended 
for projects such as LBO or takeover (which undergo significant changes in capital structure) than projects 
for corporate purposes or working capital.   
4 Specifically, the role of price terms in loan agreement is to compensate lenders  for undertaking the risk of 
loan default (e.g., Bhojraj & Sengupta, 2003); the role of non-price terms is to serve a monitoring function 
designed to curb borrowers’ tendency to engage in risky investment projects and risk-shifting activities 
(e.g., Chava & Roberts, 2008; Nini, Smith, & Sufi, 2009; Rajan & Winton, 1995). 
3 
expenditures (Angbazo, Mei, & Saunders, 1998; Hubbard, Kuttner, & Palia, 2002; 
Saunders & Steffen, 2011). Yet, there exists limited knowledge regarding the relationship 
between loan proceeds use and the composition of the non-price components of loan 
contracts.  For example, it is unclear whether certain covenants are more prone to appear 
in loans designated for one specific purpose relative to another.  In addition, although 
extant research suggests that some covenants have a reducing effect on the loan’s yield 
spread5, thus far it is unknown if that relationship holds for bank loans of all purposes or 
if they are differentiated along specific purposes.  Therefore, to draw accurate inferences 
on whether covenants have the same price-reducing effect on loans extended for different 
purposes, both price and non-price aspects of loan agreements need to be examined. 
 In a different but related stream of research, the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and the cost of debt is well established.  Extant literature argues 
that firms with large, independent, experienced, and diverse boards of directors, as well 
as low institutional ownership and strong anti-takeover governance provisions are able to 
borrow capital more cheaply.6  While many research studies that examine the impact of 
firms’ corporate governance structure on price and non-price aspects of cost of debt 
include fixed effects to control for loan purpose, they generally imply the relationship 
affects loans of all purposes uniformly.7  However, given that loans formed for different 
uses are likely to present different monitoring concerns, as well as challenges, to lenders, 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
5 According to Reisel (2014) and Wei (2005), covenants restricting issuance of additional capital, as well as 
curbing investment activities, significantly reduce bond spreads. 
6 See, for example, Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb (2004), Bradley and Chen (2011), Chen (2012), Cremers, 
Nair, and Wei (2007), Fields, Fraser, and Subrahmanyam (2012), Francis, Hasan, Koetter, and Wu (2012), 
and Klock, Mansi, and Maxwell (2005). 
7See, for example, Chava, Livdan, and Purnanandam (2009); Ferreira and Matos (2012); Francis et al. 
(2012); Graham et al. (2008); Wittenberg-Moerman, 2008. 
4 
banks may evaluate what constitutes quality corporate governance components 
differently for each type of loan purpose.8 
 Given the existing gaps in the literature discussed above, the purpose of this study 
is to address the following research questions:  (1) How does the composition of price 
and non-price loan contracting terms change for loans of different proceed designations? 
(2) How do loan purpose designations affect bank lenders’ preferences in borrowers’ 
corporate governance characteristics when determining spread yield, upfront fees, and 
covenant restrictions in new loan contracts? 
 Using a sample of 4,333 commercial loans from the DealScan database for the 
period between 1998 and 2006, we test the effect of loans’ designated purpose on loan 
contracting terms, and whether lenders use different standards to assess the quality of 
borrowers’ corporate governance for each type of loan purpose.  Although several 
previous studies attribute the significant difference in loan contracting terms to credit risk 
differential,9 several other studies argue that the variance in debt price is not always 
strictly risk-driven.10 Therefore, to reduce the effect of credit risk in our analyses, we 
control for loan and firm-related risk factors.  As a result, we conclude that our findings 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
8 For example, lenders extending credit for LBO purposes may place more value on advisory and expertise 
presence within the internal corporate governance structure that will help guide the firm as it undergoes 
significant changes in its capital structure than on close monitoring of managerial expenditures (e.g., 
Cumming, Siegel, & Wright, 2007).  With that said, loans made for general corporate purposes may benefit 
better from more protection in a form of board independence from managerial misappropriation of funds 
and/or asset substitution, but have little need for directors with extensive recapitalization experience (e.g., 
Armstrong, Guay, & Weber, 2010; Richardson, 2006). 
9For example, Cumming et al. (2007) and Denis and Denis (1995) suggest that borrowers of restructure 
loans have a higher probability of default on their debt obligations than borrowers of non-restructure loans. 
10Angbazo et al. (1998), James (1987), and Lummer and McConnell (1989), state that the purpose of the 
loan has useful information content beyond the signals about credit-worthiness that are conveyed in loan 
origination announcements.  Specifically, Megginson, Poulsen, and Sinkey (1995) determine that lenders 
are also able to charge higher rates for providing immediacy to finance loans such as asset acquisition, 
buyouts, and takeovers.?
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reflect the idiosyncrasies in contract structure based on different loan purposes, not just 
simple variations in credit risk. 
 We find that loans designated to finance asset acquisition lines, debt repayment, 
LBO, spinoff, and takeover purposes incur significantly higher spread yields than loans 
designated for commercial paper (CP) backup and working capital purposes.  We observe 
that the differential in spread between restructure11 purpose loans and operations12 
purpose loans is much higher than previously suggested in the literature, even in studies 
that also report higher spread for loans extended for purposes such as recapitalization, 
acquisition, LBO, and takeover, than loans made for other more general purposes (e.g., 
Gopalan, Nanda, & Yerramilli, 2011; Hubbard et al., 2002).  Specifically, our results 
indicate that by failing to account for loan purpose, extant research may be understating 
the spread yield by as much as 122% (150 bps) for loans with spinoff designations and 
overstating the spread by as much as 26% (32 bps) for loans with CP backup purposes. 
 Consistent with Berg, Saunders, & Steffen (2013) and Graham et al. (2008), we 
find that upfront commitment fees vary by as much as 30%.  However, we observe that 
although the reduction in upfront commitment fees is significant for borrowers of 
operations loans, loans made for restructure purposes do not exhibit a significant 
relationship with loan fees. These findings concur with extant research suggesting that 
operations loan borrowers are often able to negotiate larger upfront fee discounts than 
borrowers of loans designated for restructure purposes as a result of more extensive prior 
relationships with the lender (Bharath et al., 2011; Ivashina, 2009; Yasuda, 2005). 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
11Restructure projects are comprised of asset acquisition line, debt repayment, LBO, spinoff, and takeover 
(Ivashina & Scharfstein, 2010). 
12Operations projects are comprised of commercial paper backup, general corporate purposes, and working 
capital (Ivashina & Scharfstein, 2010). 
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 As implied by Gopalan et al. (2011), we find that overall, loan covenants are more 
prevalent among restructure purpose loans.   For example, an average restructure purpose 
loan contains an additional covenant requirement, as compared to operations purpose 
loans.  In addition, consistent with the notion that higher levels of information asymmetry 
exist between borrowers and lenders of loans for restructure projects,13 which require 
more monitoring, we find that propensity of covenant inclusion is much more sensitive to 
restructure loans than operations loans.  This is especially true for collateral requirement 
and capital raising restrictions, as supported by Nini et al. (2009). 
 Both theoretical and empirical research suggests that debt covenants have an 
inverse relationship with spread yield.14  Accordingly, we observe that while a reduction 
in the loan spread is similar for both restructure and operations purpose loans in the case 
of security requirement and dividend issuance restrictions, it differs substantially for 
financial ratios and the capital-raising sweep covenants.  For instance, we find that 
including more than two financial ratio covenants in loan agreements does not 
significantly affect the spread in restructure loans, but reduces spread yield by 12% in 
operation purpose loans. On the contrary, inclusion of the asset sales sweep restriction 
reduces spread yield by 25% in restructure purpose loans, as compared to only a 13% 
reduction effect on operations purpose loan spread.   Therefore, our results suggest that 
the impact of covenants on spread yield differs by loan purpose. 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
13 For example, according to Cumming et al. (2007), LBO loans present lenders with a number of agency 
problems that are addressed through higher levels of direct and indirect monitoring of the borrowing firm.  
In addition, Peyer and Shivdasani (2001) suggest that following recapitalization, firm executives are 
excessively focused on short-term cash generation, and thus more likely to engage in overly risky 
investments. 
14Specifically, Bradley and Roberts (2004), Jensen and Meckling (1976), and Myers (1977) develop the 
Agency Theory of Covenants, which explains the underlying reasons for the presence of covenants in debt 
agreements.  Reisel (2014) and Wei (2005) find that covenants restricting the issuance of higher priority 
claims and investment activities have a lowering effect on bond yields. 
7 
 Finally, our results indicate that the corporate governance characteristics of 
restructure loan borrowers tend to have less influence on a loan’s contracting terms than 
those of operations loan borrowers. Most notably, we observe that while board 
independence, expert directors, female directors, and directors’ voting power have a 
significant impact on debt costs for operations loans, these corporate governance 
attributes do not significantly affect loans for restructure purposes.  Thus, we conclude 
that consistent with extant literature, lenders extending loans for restructure purposes do 
not heavily rely on firms’ existing corporate governance for monitoring needs mainly 
because they are aware that the high probability of technical default on the loan will 
allow them to exert their own influence on the firm’s governance mechanisms.15  
Creditors’ reliance on borrowers’ existing corporate governance structure for operations 
purpose loans is also supported by extensive literature stating that quality board of 
directors and low shareholder control have a reducing effect on firm’s cost of debt.16 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 will discuss 
background literature and state testable hypotheses.  Section 3 will describe the sample, 
explain variable measures, and present summary statistics.  Section 4 will provide results 
for the multivariate analyses.  Section 5 will offer robustness checks and data sensitivity 
tests.  Section 6 will summarize and present our concluding remarks. 
  
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
15Baird and Rasmussen (2006), Chava and Roberts (2008), and Roberts and Sufi (2009a), among others, 
assert that creditors gain significant power over borrowing firm’s corporate governance when at least one 
loan covenant is violated. According to Roberts and Sufi (2009b), covenant violations are most prevalent 
among firms that are smaller and those with lower credit rating, as similar to our sample of loans 
designated for restructure purposes.  ?
16 See, for example, Anderson et al. (2004),Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and LaFond (2006), Bhojraj and 
Sengupta (2003), Fields et al. (2012). 
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2.  Background Literature 
 
2.1.  Loan Purpose 
 The seminal agency theory helps explain that one of the main reasons firms seek 
debt capital over equity is to reduce conflict between firm’s equity holders and its 
management (Harris & Raviv, 1991; Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  However, the 
underlying reasons for why firms require the additional capital lie in specific needs of the 
borrowing firms.  For example, a company in need of funds to finance day-to-day 
operations is likely to apply for a working capital loan, while a firm desiring to refinance 
existing debt may inquire about a debt repayment loan.  Firms borrow additional capital 
to fund numerous different projects; however, the seven common primary loan 
designations are asset acquisition line, debt restructuring, leveraged-buyout (LBO), 
takeover, general corporate purpose, commercial paper (CP) backup, and working capital 
(e.g., Angbazo et al., 1998; Strahan, 1999).  Further, although each loan purpose category 
is unique in how it is perceived by lenders, they are often classified as either “restructure” 
or “operations” loans.  Specifically, restructure loans are those that increase a firm’s 
leverage, change ownership, or require other changes that are not essential to day-to-day 
operations, such as asset acquisition, debt repayment, LBO, spinoff, stock buyback, and 
takeover (Eckbo & Thorburn, 2008; Francois & Missonier-Piera, 2007; Gupta, Singh, & 
Zebedee, 2008; Ivashina & Scharfstein, 2010).  Operations loans, also referred to as non-
restructure, real-investment, or general purpose, are used to facilitate predictable 
investments in physical or working capital (Ivashina & Scharfstein, 2010; Hubbard et al., 
9 
2002).  Operations loans typically include loans designated for finance projects such as 
general corporate purposes, commercial paper backup, and working capital. 
 Extant literature tends to regard loans within the restructure category as riskier by 
lenders than operations loans, since restructure loans indicate a substantial change in a 
borrower’s capital structure (e.g., Carey, Post, & Sharpe, 1998; Harjoto, Mullineaux, & 
Yi, 2006; Wittenberg-Moerman, 2008).  For instance, Denis and Denis (1995) report that 
31% of LBO firms in their sample encountered financial distress.  However, according to 
Angbazo et al. (1998), James (1987), and Lummer and McConnell (1989), the purpose of 
the loan offers useful information beyond borrowers’ credit-worthiness.  As an example, 
loan purpose conveys insight about borrowers’ need for immediacy, as in asset 
acquisition, buyout, and takeover loans (e.g., Megginson et al., 1995); investments in 
negative NPV, as in debt refinancing and recapitalization loans (Angbazo et al., 1998; 
Denis, 1990); and provision of liquidity, as in CP backup loans (Gatev & Strahan, 2006).  
Therefore, we expect to gain further understanding beyond the risk structure, discerning 
the idiosyncratic nature of loans made for various specific purposes. 
 
2.2.  Price Components of Loan Contracting 
 According to the traditional banking theory, credit risk is one of the main 
determinants of loan pricing (e.g., Freixas and Rochet, 1997).   For example, several prior 
studies cite risk as the reason that loans within the restructure purposes category have 
significantly higher spread yields than loans within the non-restructure purposes category 
(e.g., Gopalan et al., 2011; Harjoto et al., 2006; Hubbard et al., 2002; Saunders & Steffen, 
2011).   However, extant research does not examine the relationship between loan spread 
10 
and loan purpose in detail, both as individual specific purposes and a group.  Further, 
credit risk is not the sole factor influencing loan spread yields.  Loan pricing is also 
strongly affected by firms’ demands for immediacy (e.g, Megginson et al., 1995), 
securitization (e.g., Benmelech & Bergman, 2009; Booth & Booth, 2009; John, Lynch, & 
Puri, 2003), quality of corporate governance (e.g., Anderson et al., 2004; Cremers et al., 
2007; Fields et al., 2012), as well as the number and tightness of restrictive covenants 
(Bradley & Roberts, 2004; Matvos, 2013; Murfin, 2012; Reisel, 2014).  According to 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Lehn and Poulsen (1989), buyout firms possess low 
corporate control, while Peyer and Shivdasani (2001) suggest that recapitalized firms 
tend to struggle with immediate cash flow.  In addition, Cumming et al. (2007) suggest 
that LBO firms require costly intense monitoring.  Given that firms seeking loans within 
the restructure classification are more likely to need immediate funding, possess lower 
quality corporate governance attributes, and require more oversight, we expect that 
restructure loan contracts will have higher spread than operations loan contracts.  Thus, 
we form our first testable hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1:  Loans designated to fund restructure projects (i.e., asset 
acquisition line, debt repayment, LBO, spinoff, and takeover) will incur 
higher spread than loans designated to fund operations projects (i.e., 
general corporate purposes, CP backup, and working capital). 
 
 Berg et al. (2013) find that loan fees significantly contribute to the increase in loan 
price, by as much as 38%.  Similar to loan spread yields, Graham et al. (2008) and 
Ivashina (2009), among others, find that transaction fees on commercial loans tend to 
increase with the complexity and riskiness of the loan.  However, unlike loan spreads, 
11 
loan fees do not directly compensate lenders for undertaking higher levels of credit risk.  
Instead, according to Angbazo et al. (1998), loan fees are used to complement loan 
spreads for syndication, commitment, and cancellation risks.  Lower fees are also 
associated with larger loans, primarily because fees are measured as the percentage of 
loan amount and larger loans have the benefit of economies of scale (e.g., Berg et al., 
2013).  Further, Yasuda (2005) finds that relationship banking significantly reduces loan 
fees, primarily as a result of lower levels of information asymmetry.  In addition, Bharath 
et al. (2011) suggest that borrowers of restructure purpose loans, such as LBOs, typically 
are less likely to have established relationships with their lenders than borrowers of 
operations loans, such as CP backup.  Specifically, they find that over 88% of firms 
seeking CP backup loans have an established relationship with the leading lender, 
compared to only 47% of borrowers applying for LBO loans.  Since restructure loans 
tend to be more complex to administer than operations loans, and restructure firms are 
less likely to have a prior relationship with the lender, we predict that restructure loans 
will bear higher fees than operations loans. 
 
Hypothesis 2:  Loans designated to fund restructure projects (i.e., asset 
acquisition line, debt repayment, LBO, spinoff, and takeover) will incur 
higher loan fees than loans designated to fund operations projects (i.e., 
general corporate purposes, CP backup, and working capital). 
 
2.3.  Loan Covenants 
 To reduce credit risk, as well as mitigate the risk of asset misappropriation, 
lenders typically include non-price monitoring provisions in their loan agreements in the 
form of loan covenants that are designed to curb the firm’s ability to engage in risky 
12 
investment projects and risk-shifting activities.  Covenants are a powerful component of 
loan contracting because violation of even one covenant results in a technical default of a 
loan, allowing lenders to impose additional interventions, not just regarding repayment or 
renegotiation of the loan, but even gaining corporate control.17  Firms that are perceived 
as riskier due to informational opacity generally have loan covenants that are more 
intense and restrictive (e.g., Bradley & Roberts, 2004; Demiroglu & James, 2010; Dichev 
& Skinner, 2002).  According to Gupta et al. (2008) and Wittenberg-Moerman (2008), 
borrowers of restructure loans are more likely to suffer from information opacity due to 
the uncertainty in outcome of the substantial changes in a borrower’s capital structure, 
than borrowers of operations loans. Further, Citron, Robbie, and Wright (1997) find that 
loans made to finance buyouts contain more covenants, while Gopalan et al. (2011) report 
that working capital loans have significantly less intense and restrictive covenants than 
takeover and repayment loans.  Therefore, we predict that restructure loan contracting 
terms will contain more covenant restrictions. 
 
Hypothesis 3:  Loans designated to fund restructure projects (i.e., asset 
acquisition line, debt repayment, LBO, spinoff, and takeover) will contain 
more covenants than loans designated to fund operations projects (i.e., 
general corporate purposes, CP backup, and working capital). 
 
2.4.  Loan Spread vs. Loan Covenants 
 Some prior research finds that price and non-price components of loan contracting 
act as complements for one another (e.g., Strahan, 1999; Rajan & Winton, 1995).  They 
claim that riskier borrowers pay higher price premiums and incur more and tighter 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
17According to Baird and Rasmussen (2006, p. 1211), “when a business trips one of the wires in a large 
loan, the lender is able to exercise de facto control rights – such as replacing the CEO of a company – that 
shareholders of a public company simply do not have.”   
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non-price restrictions.  However, such argument contradicts the Agency Theory of 
Covenants, which attempts to explain the underlying reason for the presence of covenants 
in debt contracts (e.g., Bradley & Roberts, 2004; Jensen & Mecklin, 1976; Myers, 1977; 
Smith & Warner, 1979).  The theory suggests that in order to reduce the agency conflict 
(and the associated agency costs) between shareholders and bondholders, covenants are 
used to restrict the behavior of managers and thus, better align their interests to those of 
bondholders.  Therefore, the theory implies that shareholders are able to benefit from the 
inclusion of bondholders’ covenant restrictions. 
 More recent empirical research studies, such as Bradley and Roberts (2004) and 
Demiroglu and James (2010) find that loan contracting terms are determined 
simultaneously, where borrowers are often given the option to choose from 
predetermined loan packages featuring different levels of spread yields, fees, and 
intensity and restrictiveness of covenants.  Assuming that the firm is provided with a 
choice, reason states that a rational borrower will only choose a loan contract with more 
intense and/or restrictive covenants if price terms of the loan are sufficiently reduced to 
the level where benefits from inclusion of covenants outweigh the associated costs.  
Further, the notion that loan covenants have a reducing effect on loan price is in accord 
with findings in private loans by Matvos (2013) and in public debt by Reisel (2014) and 
Wei (2005).  Specifically, using a novel statistical approach, they find that covenants 
restricting the issuance of higher priority claims and investment activities have an inverse 
relationship with bond yields, especially in the case of high growth firms and firms with 
low probability of default.  Given that restructure loans tend to incur higher spread than 
operations loans, borrowers of restructure loans have stronger incentive to signal to 
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lenders that they are not risky, but creditworthy borrowers, by accepting additional 
covenant restrictions in order to reduce the spread amount (e.g., Beatty, Ramash, & 
Weber, 2002; Gopalan et al., 2011; Saunders & Steffen, 2011).  Thus, we expect that 
loans made for restructure purposes will exhibit more sensitivity in their relationship 
between loan spread and loan covenants than loans made for operations purposes. 
 
Hypothesis 4:  Loans designated to fund restructure projects (i.e., asset 
acquisition line, debt repayment, LBO, spinoff, and takeover) will be more 
sensitive in their relationship between loan spread and loan covenants 
than loans designated to fund operations projects (i.e., general corporate 
purposes, CP backup, and working capital). 
 
2.5.  Corporate Governance 
 One of the main ingredients of strong corporate governance recognized by lenders 
is an effective board of directors, which is charged with the task to provide advice and 
oversee management’s behavior within the firm (Ge, Kim, & Song, 2012).  However, the 
directors are elected by the shareholders of the firm and, therefore, their mission is first 
and foremost to protect and maximize the shareholders’ investments, above other 
shareholders such as the firms’ creditors.  Nevertheless, extensive empirical evidence 
supports that lenders are also able to benefit from select board qualities.  In particular, 
banks recognize the advantages of utilizing board monitoring in mitigating information 
risk ex ante and controlling agency risk ex post (e.g., Francis et al., 2012).  Further, 
lenders reward firms with higher-quality boards of directors with more favorable loan 
contract terms.  Specifically, extant research suggests that lenders are more willing to 
provide loans at a lower cost, as well as often with fewer and less intense covenants, to 
firms whose boards are large, diverse, more independent, have higher number of busy 
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and experienced directors, and lower directorship ownership (e.g., Anderson et al., 2004; 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006; Bhojraj & Sengupta, 2003; Fields et al., 2012; Francis et al., 
2012).  In addition, favorable loan terms are extended to firms with low shareholder 
control, such as low institutional ownership and fewer anti-takeover governance 
provisions (e.g. Cremers et al., 2007; Ge et al., 2012; Klock et al., 2005). 
 The existing body of literature offers findings concerning the relationship between 
corporate governance and the costs of loan contracting with the general assumption that 
they apply to loans of any designated purpose.  However, given that loans formed for 
different uses are likely to present lenders with diverse and unique concerns and 
challenges, banks may evaluate the composition of quality corporate governance 
components differently for each type of loan purpose.  For example, Kaplan and 
Stromberg (2008) argue that the monitoring role of boards in public companies is 
undermined following restructure projects, such as buyouts, debt restructure, and 
takeovers, where the firm is acquired by private equity groups.  Since, private equity firm 
partners often have a long experience in restructuring companies, the critical operations 
decisions are typically made by private equity sponsors, rather than the board of 
directors.  In addition, although Cumming et al. (2007) find that lenders of LBO loans 
rely on the borrower’s corporate governance for monitoring, Gilson (1990) clarifies that 
following debt restructure, lenders replace almost 55% of incumbent directors in order to 
gain more control over the firm.  Further, Cornelli and Karakas (2008) show that during 
firm restructuring periods, expertise typically comes from external sources. Therefore, 
lenders extending credit for restructure projects are likely to prefer more direct 
involvement in monitoring the firm’s decisions during the transition period rather than 
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outsource to borrower’s existing board of directors.  Conversely, lenders of the less risky 
operations loans are likely to be more willing to delegate monitoring duties to effective 
boards of directors, and thus place a much higher value on effective corporate governance 
attributes, such as board independence and high levels of expertise to help protect 
themselves from managerial misappropriation of funds and asset substitution (e.g., 
Armstrong et al., 2010; Richardson, 2006). Therefore, based on the arguments presented 
above, we expect that borrowers’ corporate governance characteristics will have a 
stronger influence on contracting terms of operations loans than restructure loans. 
 
Hypothesis 5:  Loan contracting terms of loans designated for restructure 
purposes (i.e., asset acquisition line, debt repayment, LBO, spinoff, and 
takeover) will exhibit less sensitivity toward borrowing firm’s corporate 
governance characteristics than loan contracting terms of loans 
designated for operations purposes (i.e., general corporate purposes, CP 
backup, and working capital). 
 
3.  Data Description and Variables 
 
3.1.  Data Sources and Sample Selection Criteria 
 For our sample, we obtain the terms of bank loan agreements from DealScan, a 
database created and marketed by Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC).  The database 
contains detailed loan information for U.S. and foreign commercial loans made to 
corporations and government entities during the period between January 1998 and 
December 2006.  According to LPC, approximately half of the loan data are from SEC 
filings (13Ds, 14Ds, 13Es, 10Ks, 10Qs, 8Ks, and registration statements).  The other half 
are obtained from contacts within the credit history and from borrowers, lenders, and the 
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credit industry at large.  Non-SEC filing sources of data have become relatively important 
in the later years of DealScan. 
 For the purpose of the current study, we focus on dollar-denominated bank loans 
of non-financial U.S. firms that have financial information in Compustat for the fiscal 
year preceding the loan agreement, as well as the board of directors’ characteristics data 
in the RiskMetrics database.  As suggested by Demiroglu and James (2010), we exclude 
short-term loans because, for such types of loans, the loan renewal or rollover process 
serves as a substitute for covenants in controlling moral hazard.  The resulting overall 
loan sample is comprised of 4,333 loans representing 2,756 firm-years for 923 unique 
borrowers. 
 We recognize that as with other research studying the impact of corporate 
governance composition, there may be some concern regarding potential simultaneity 
and/or endogeneity issues.18  We attempt to minimize these concerns through careful 
construction of our sample.19  Specifically, we lag our measurement of corporate 
governance variables by one year before we assess the association between governance 
variables and credit terms.  As a result, our corporate governance measures are from the 
period between January 1997 and December 2005, while loan contracting details are 
from January 1998 to December 2006.  A similar lagging technique is applied by Dittmar 
and Mahrt-Smith (2007) and Fields et al. (2012).  Since firms’ governance typically is 
slow to change, the potential for loan costs to affect these governance characteristics is 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
18Hermalin and Weisbach (2003, p.8) observe that empirical studies of corporate governance are 
complicated by the fact that “almost all variables of interest are endogenous.” 
19 We will conduct additional procedures designed to mitigate and correct potential endogeneity issues in 
Section 5 of this study. 
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small; however, when firms are experiencing financial difficulties, changes within 
governance structure are implemented quicker (i.e., Gilson, 1990). 
 
3.2.  Measures of Loan Purpose 
 We determine the loan purpose for each facility based on the Specific Purpose 
category available within DealScan.  Of the 28 purposes available, we narrow down to 
eight specific purposes with the highest frequency.  Consequently, our study examines 
the following loan purposes:  acquisition line, CP backup, corporate purposes, debt 
repayment, LBO, spinoff, takeover, and working capital.  In addition, following the 
precedence set in several other studies, we further categorize these loan purposes into 
restructure and operations loans (i.e., Gupta et al., 2008; Hubbard et al., 2002; Ivashina & 
Schafstein, 2010).  Specifically, restructure loans are composed of acquisition line, debt 
repayment, LBO, spinoff, and takeover; while operations loans are comprised of CP 
backup, corporate purposes, and working capital.  We code restructure loans as 1 and 
operations loans as 0. 
 
3.3.  Measures of Bank Loan Characteristics 
 In accordance with previous research on loan contracting, we examine loan terms 
as both price and non-price components.20  Price components consist of spread and 
commitment fees.  Spread is the interest rate that the borrower pays on its loan.  It is 
measured using the All-in-Spread-Drawn category within DealScan that represents the 
borrowing cost per each dollar of the loan drawn.  Spread is calculated as a basis point 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
20See, for example, Bradley and Roberts (2004); Bharath et al. (2011); Chava et al. (2009); Demiroglu and 
James (2010); Fields et al. (2012); Francis et al. (2012); Ivashina (2009). 
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markup over the 6-month LIBOR, plus any recurring fees associated with the lending 
facility.  Commitment fees are also referred to as upfront transaction fees that compensate 
the lead lender for underwriting, dispensing, and monitoring costs related to the undrawn 
funds of the loan.  This variable is determined using the Commitment Fees category 
within DealScan, where it is reported in basis points.21  For the purpose of utilizing 
spread and commitment fees in our multivariate analyses, both variables are transposed 
with natural log. 
 Non-price components of loan contracting are measured using the loan covenant 
intensity index, adapted from Bradley and Roberts (2004).  The loan covenant intensity 
index, hereafter referred to as the covenant index, is an aggregate measure of covenant 
structure, comprised of the six most commonly used covenant indicators within 
commercial loans that are available in DealScan.22  The impact of each of the covenants 
within the index is the same by assigning one point to each covenant.  The specific 
covenant restrictions included in the index are:  secured debt, dividend restriction, more 
than two financial ratios, asset sweep, debt sweep, and equity sweep.  The covenant 
index measure is criticized for its lack of assessment of covenant tightness and strictness, 
especially with recent developments of alternative measures, such as the contract 
strictness measure by Murfin (2012) that captures the ex-ante probability of a forced 
renegotiation between lender and borrower.  However, the Murfin covenant strictness 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
21 According to Berg et al. (2013), there are over 10 different types of loan fees that can appear in bank loan 
contracts.  However, many of these fees are included in the standard all-in-spread-drawn measure of loan 
price.  Further, the Dealscan database available to us contains specific loan fee categories only for annual 
fees (included in all-in-spread-drawn) and commitment fees.   
22 Bradley and Roberts’ (2004) decision on which covenants to include in the index was largely dependent 
on covenant categories that have been identified in the literature as the most prevalent in commercial loans 
(e.g., Billet, King, & Mauer, 2007; Paglia & Mullineaux, 2006; and Smith & Warner, 1979). 
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measure uses only financial ratio covenants.  Since the covenant intensity index assesses 
the effects of both financial and non-financial aspects of loan contracting, it is an 
appropriate measure for addressing the needs of this study.  Further, we retest our loan 
covenant analyses using the Murfin approach as the dependent variable instead of the 
covenant index in the robustness section, and determine that the results are not 
significantly different. 
 Other bank loan characteristics included in our study are loan size, loan maturity, 
syndicated, number of lenders, and investment grade.  Loan size is the tranche amount 
corresponding to individual loan purpose, scaled back by the total assets of the firm.  
Loan maturity of the loan is reported in natural log months.  Syndicated represents the 
percentage of loans financed by syndicates of lenders, versus sole lenders or other 
arrangements.  Number of lenders is the natural log of the number of lenders that have a 
direct stake in any particular loan.  Investment grade is a dummy-coded variable that 
takes a value of 1 if the firm received credit rating of Baa or higher, and 0 if the firm was 
rated below Baa. 
 
3.4.  Measures of Corporate Governance Characteristics 
 In accord with extant related literature, we examine the efficacy of a firm’s 
corporate governance through multiple dimensions.  Prior research studying which 
aspects of corporate governance affect firms’ terms of loan contracting suggests that we 
explore both the board of directors and shareholder control avenues.23  Specifically, the 
board of directors’ characteristics that receive a great deal of research attention are board 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
23 See, for example, Asquith et al. (2005); Bharath et al. (2011); Demiroglu and James (2010); Dennis et al. 
(2000); Gorton and Kahn (2000); Kim et al. (2011); Qian and Strahan (2007). 
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size, independence, busyness, and board presence of experts and females.  Other board 
characteristics that we also include are directors’ average tenure with the firm, number of 
directors with international background, and directors of ethnic minority.  The 
shareholder control is examined through board vote power and the anti-takeover 
governance provisions index, G-index.  All corporate governance variables come from 
the RiskMetrics database. 
 We measure board size as the natural log of the total number of directors serving 
on the board.  To determine independence, we start off by reviewing directors’ 
affiliations with a given firm and dividing them into two categories:  insider versus 
independent.  Directors who are coded as “employees” or “linked” by RiskMetrics are 
classified as insiders, while those who are coded as “independent” by RiskMetrics are 
also classified as independent by us.  We calculate independence as the number of 
independent directors divided by the total number of directors on board.  We define busy 
directors as those who serve on the board of at least three major for-profit 
firms.24Busyness is measured as the ratio of busy directors to total number of directors on 
board.  To study the impact of directors’ level of expertise on loan terms, we utilize 
directors’ employment category available in RiskMetrics.  We classify directors 
employed in accounting, investor/financial services, academics, attorney/counsel, 
consultant, and medical sectors as experts with potentially valuable unique knowledge 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
24 This definition is consistent with the U.S. Council of Institutional Investors’ Corporate Governance 
Policies (2009).  Unlike many existing studies on busy boards, this definition does not require director 
independence.  However, we wanted to capture the overall effect of director busyness, as well as avoid the 
potential multicollinearity concerns between independent directors and the traditional busy independent 
directors. 
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that they can use to advise the firm.25  To measure experts, we apply the natural log to the 
total number of experts serving on the board of directors.  Board tenure is calculated as 
the sum of the number of years that the current directors served on the board, divided by 
the number of directors.  To study the impact of board of directors’ diversity on loan 
contracting, we examine the role of female, internationality, and ethnic minority.  
Females is the proportion of female directors to board size.  International is based on 
directors’ country of employment available in RiskMetrics.  For directors for whom the 
information is reported, if the country of employment is U.S., then we code that director 
as 0, otherwise we code international as 1.  We add the number of international directors 
for each firm and divide that value by the total number of directors serving on the board.  
RiskMetrics also provides information about directors’ ethnicity.  If the ethnicity 
category reports racial background as African-American, Asian, or Hispanic, then ethnic 
minority variable is classified as 1, if ethnicity category indicates Caucasian background, 
then ethnic minority is classified as 0.  Similar to the international variable, we combine 
the number of directors of ethnic minority for each firm and divide it by board size.  
Board vote power is defined as the percentage of outstanding stock shares held by all 
directors serving on the board.  G-Index is a governance index developed and provided in 
RiskMetrics by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), which is composed of 24 anti-




25 We also tested our models with expertise limited to the financial sector (accounting and 
investor/financial services), which yielded results not significantly different than using the expanded 
expertise definition.  In addition, given the different designations of loans in our sample, the study may 
benefit from inclusion of broader sources of advice. 
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3.5.  Measures of Financial Characteristics 
 To study firms’ financial qualities, we obtain all accounting variables from 
Compustat for the fiscal year-end for each firm prior to the lending agreement. We 
measure firm size using the market capitalization variable, which is calculated by 
multiplying the firm’s number of outstanding common stock shares as reported in the 
quarterly SEC filing reports by the price of that stock on the last day of the respective 
quarter.  To study the impact of existing debt on terms of new loan contracting, we 
calculate leverage as the ratio of total debt held by the firm to total assets.  Sales turnover 
is measured as firm’s total annual sales revenue divided by total assets.  ROA is 
determined as a ratio of EBITDA over total assets.  Market to book is the ratio of book 
assets minus book equity plus market equity over book assets.  Current ratio is firm’s 
currents assets divided by current liabilities. 
 
3.6.  Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 1 presents a general overview of descriptive statistics on loan, corporate 
governance, and financial characteristics for the main loan purposes analyzed in this 
study.  We observe that almost 97% of loans in our sample have a specific designated 
purpose, distributed among the eight main loan purposes that we study.  Consistent with 
the existing literature, the price components of a loan contract vary greatly by expected 
use loans’ proceeds.26  Specifically, the spread yield ranges from 50.30 bps for CP 
backup loans to 354 bps for LBO loans, even though CP backup commitment fees at 32 
bps are on par with acquisition line and takeover loans.  The covenant index values also 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
26 See, for example, Angbazo et al. (1998); Carey et al. (1998); Gopalan et al. (2011); Harjoto et al. (2006); 
Hubbard et al. (2002); Saunders and Steffen (2011). 
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vary significantly by loan purpose, ranging from 1.4 covenants for CP backup loans to 
4.39 covenants for spinoff loans, with the overall average of 2.73 being comparable to 
extant covenant index research (e.g., Bradley & Roberts, 2004; Demiroglu & James, 
2010; Fields et al., 2012). 
 The largest mean loan amount of more than $1.1 billion is made for spinoff 
purposes, while the smallest mean amount of about $210 million is made for LBO 
purposes.  Expectantly, given the revolving nature of CP backup loans, these loans have 
the shortest maturity duration of about 22 months, whereas the average tenor for LBO 
loans is almost 70 months.  Further, over 90% of CP backup loans in our sample are 
made to investment-grade firms, while none of the LBO loans are investment-grade. 
 Consistent with the literature on the relation between firm size and board of 
directors’ size, LBO loans in our sample are made to small firms with fewer than average 
number of directors on their boards.27  In addition, we observe that firms of asset 
acquisition, debt repayment, and takeover loans, have lower proportion of independent 
directors on their boards than firms of CP backup, corporate purposes, and working 
capital loans.  Similarly, with an exception of spinoff loan firms, boards of restructure 
firms tend to be less busy, which is consistent with extant studies (e.g., Fich & 
Shivdasani, 2007; Gilson, 1990; Yermack, 2004).   The G-Index indicates a relatively 
low shareholder control of around 10 anti-takeover provisions among spinoff and CP 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
27 For example, Boone, Field, Karpoff, and Raheja (2007) and Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2008) find that 
for larger and more complex firms, it is more optimal to have larger boards with more outside directors, 
while for smaller and simpler firms, it is more optimal to have smaller boards with fewer outside directors.  
In addition, Cornelli and Karakas (2008) find that firms following LBO restructure drastically reduce their 
board size to increase efficiency of the board of directors. 
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backup firms, but a higher shareholder control among debt repayment firms with about 
8.8 provisions. 
 In Table 2, we provide t-test statistics on the differences between restructure and 
operations loans.  As supported in the literature (e.g., Gopalan et al., 2011; Harjoto et al., 
2006; Hubbard et al., 2002; Saunders & Steffen, 2011) and suggested in Table 1, the loan 
spread amount for restructure loans is almost 62 bps higher than for operations loans, 
which is statistically significant.  Similar observations are made for commitment fees, 
both in bps and the percentage of loans with fees.  The covenant index indicates that 
compared to operations loans, restructure loans contain about one additional covenant 
restriction than operations loans.  Specifically, of the six covenant restrictions included in 
the index, only the dividend issuance covenant reports higher prevalence among 
operations loans, while the other five show significantly higher percentages among 
restructure loans. No significant differences are observed in terms of loan size and the 
loan amount to assets ratio, as well as the number of lenders involved in extending the 
loan.  However, restructure loans have significantly longer maturity, while a much higher 
proportion of operations loans is investment-grade. 
 Compared to operations loans firms, firms requesting restructure loans have 
significantly fewer members on the board of directors, as well as boards that are less 
independent and less busy.  Further boards of restructure loan firms have fewer financial 
and non-financial experts, international directors, and directors of ethnic minority.  We 
do not find significant differences in director tenure.  However, directors in operations 
loan firms are on average slightly older, while directors in restructure loan firms hold 
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higher stock ownership.  According to the G-Index, restructure loan firms have slightly 
lower number of anti-takeover provisions in place. 
 Based on the total assets and market value of equity indicators, operations loan 
firms are significantly larger.  Further, even though based on the sales to total assets 
ratio, operations loan firms have a slightly better sales turnover, restructure loan firms 
appear to post significantly more favorable ROA and current ratios.  However, firms of 
restructure loans have higher debt ratios, both long-term and leverage.  The market to 
book ratio is not significantly different between the two groups of loans.  
 
4.  Results 
 To test the effects of loan purpose and corporate governance attributes on debt 
contracting terms, we utilize ordinary least square (OLS) regression for both linear 
dependent variables, such as spread yield and loan fees, and discrete outcome variables, 
such as covenant index.  We recognize that Poisson maximum likelihood estimation is a 
more appropriate tool for analyzing non-linear dependent variables.  However, after 
comparing outcome results using both OLS and Poisson estimations, we determine that 
the produced outputs are not significantly different.  Since OLS allows for more 
extensive interpretation, we present OLS results.  In our analyses, we use robust standard 
errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level, since loans made to the same firm are 
more likely correlated.  Further, we include year and industry dummy variables to control 




4.1.  Loan Purpose and Debt Contracting Terms 
 Table 3 presents multivariate statistics results relating price and non-price debt 
contracting terms to loan purpose, as well as the corporate governance and firm 
financials controls.  In column 1, we examine the OLS output of loan purpose categories 
on loan spread.  We find that acquisition line, debt repayment, LBO, spinoff, and 
takeover loan purposes have an increasing effect on spread, while CP backup and 
working capital have a decreasing effect on the dependent variable.  Specifically, loans 
with spinoff purpose pay around 122% higher spread than loans with a different 
designated purpose; compared to the mean loan spread value of 121.69 bps, loans made 
for spinoff purposes pay almost 150 bps more.  On the contrary, spread for loans with CP 
backup purpose is about 26% lower than for non-CP backup purposes, which is around 
32 bps less than the average spread value.  These results accord with prior research 
suggesting that lenders charge significantly higher interest rates for loans that demand 
immediacy, such as asset acquisition lines, buyouts, and takeovers (e.g., Megginson et al., 
1995; Saunders & Schumacher, 2000), as well as for loans that are perceived by lenders 
as negative NPV investments, such as debt repayment and recapitalization (e.g., Angbazo 
et al., 1998; Denis, 1990).  Further, extant literature supports lower spread yields for loans 
with shorter maturity duration and higher credit rating, such as CP backup and working 
capital loans (e.g., Gottesman & Roberts, 2004; Graham et al., 2008). 
 Similar to loan spread, commitment fees in column 2 are also affected by loan 
purpose distinction.  However, we observe statistical and economical significance only 
among operations loans – CP backup, corporate purposes, and working capital.  Our 
results indicate that borrowers of CP backup loans pay about 30% (8 bps) less in 
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commitment fees.  Our findings are consistent with extant research claiming that 
borrowers of loans such as CP backup pay lower commitment fees as a result of 
previously established relationship with the leading bank (e.g., Bharath et al, 2011; 
Yasuda, 2005). 
 Next, we consider the impact of individual loan purpose categories on non-price 
aspects of debt contracting terms.  Column 3 of Table 3 reveals that coefficients for 
acquisition line, LBO, spinoff, and takeover loan purposes have a positive and 
statistically significant relationship with covenant index, while the coefficients for CP 
backup, corporate purposes, and working capital loan purposes are not significantly 
different from zero.  Economically, we observe that loans with LBO and spinoff 
designations contain about two additional covenants, as compared to the average 
covenant index value of 2.73 out of the maximum value of six.  These findings are in 
agreement with Citron et al. (1997), Demiroglu and James (2010), and Gopalan et al. 
(2011), who find that restructure loans, such as acquisition lines, buyouts, and takeovers 
contain more and tighter covenants. 
 In columns 4 through 6, we test the relationship between loan purpose and loan 
contracting terms, where loan purpose categories are dummy-coded as either restructure 
or operations.  Comparable to our previous assessments, these results confirm that 
compared to loans made for operations purposes, contract agreements of restructure loans 
are comprised of significantly higher spread yields and commitment fees, as well as 
higher number of covenant restrictions.  Therefore, given that relationships of individual 
loan purposes with loan contracting terms are appropriately represented within either the 
restructure or operations purpose categories, allows us to implement the two general 
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purpose categories in subsequent analyses.  Based on the results presented in Table 3, 
columns 1 through 6,we conclude that loan proceed designation indeed influences the 
composition of price and non-price loan contracting terms as predicted in Hypotheses 1 
through 3.  Further, statistics for corporate governance characteristics, loan features, and 
firm financial standings controls included in this table are consistent with existing loan 
contracting research (e.g., Anderson et al.,2004; Bradley & Chen, 2011; Chen, 2012; 
Fields et al., 2012; Francis et al., 2012;Klock et al., 2005). 
 
4.2.  Loan Purpose and Covenant Restrictions 
 To gain a better understanding of the relationship between loan designations and 
non-price terms of bank loan contracting, we conduct Logit maximum likelihood 
estimation for each component of the covenant intensity index in Table 4.  Column 1 
presents the effect loan purpose categories have on the security requirement of a loan.  
Consistent with the literature, we find acquisition line, LBO, and spinoff loans are more 
likely to have security requirement included in their loan contracts (e.g., Angbazo et al., 
1998; John et al., 2003; Nini et al., 2009).  For example, loans with LBO and spinoff 
designations are 25% and 37% more likely to have security requirement covenant 
included in their contracts than other loans, respectively. 
 Column 2 shows that loans of all purposes have positive and statistically 
significant coefficients, suggesting that when imposing dividend issuance restrictions, 
banks do not differentiate by expected loan use.  This finding is consistent with results in 
Table 2, where we find that around 90% of both restructure and operations loans have 
dividend restrictions.  Accordingly, Black and Scholes (1973), Black (1976 p. 10), and 
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Smith and Warner (1979) warn us that “there is no easier way for a company to escape 
the burden of a debt than to pay out all of its assets in the form of a dividend, and leave 
the creditors holding an empty shelf.”  Therefore, it is logical that banks insist that most 
loans carry the dividend issuance covenant restriction to protect themselves from 
borrowers’ potential payout of assets to shareholders. 
 In column 3 of Table 4, the more than two financial ratios covenant restriction is 
positively related to all restructure loans (although only LBO is statistically significant) 
and negatively related to operations loans.  In column 4, we group asset sale, debt issue, 
and equity issue sweep restrictions into one category.28  The results reveal that acquisition 
line, LBO, spinoff, and takeover loans have positive and statistically significant effect on 
inclusion of sweep restriction covenants in loan contract.  Of the operations loan 
purposes, coefficients of all categories are negative, although statistically non-significant.  
These results are in agreement with Campbell (2009), who states that asset acquisition 
loans tend to have very carefully crafted sweep covenants to ensure that they provide 
adequate lender protection without putting excessive hardship on the firm.  Overall, our 
findings are supported by literature that loans extended to finance restructure purposes 
require higher levels of monitoring through covenant restrictions than loans made for 




28 We also perform analyses for each individual sweep category, with similar results.  The practice of 
combining sweep categories into one is also seen in Fields et al. (2012).  In addition, Bradley and Roberts 
(2004) find that most loans contain either all three sweeps covenants, or none at all. 
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4.3.  Loan Purpose and Price Benefits of Covenant Restrictions 
 Table 5 presents our results on price benefits that borrowing firms receive for 
including covenant restrictions in contract agreements for loans designated to finance 
restructure and operations purposes.  We find that although the price benefit of some 
covenants is similar for both restructure and operations loans, other covenants affect 
restructure loans differently than operations loans.  Specifically, consistent with Matvos 
(2013), we find that including the security requirement and dividend issuance restrictions 
reduces spread yields of both restructure and operations purpose loans by about 23% and 
10%, respectively.  However, the economical significance is greater for restructure loans 
because these loans, on average, have spreads that are about 58% (62 bps) higher than 
operations loans.  Therefore, a 23% reduction in spread yield for restructure loans equates 
to about 39 bps, but only 25 bps for operations loans. 
 Price benefits for inclusion of financial ratios and sweep restrictions vary by loan 
purpose to a greater extent.  The financial ratios restriction has a statistically significant 
price benefit of almost 12% in operations loans, but only a trivial and statistically non-
significant reduction of spread in loans for restructure purposes.  However, the asset sale, 
debt issuance, and equity issuance sweep restrictions are significantly higher and 
economically considerable for restructure purpose loans than operations purpose loans.  
For example, inclusion of the asset sale sweep restriction reduces spread yield of 
restructure loans by about 25% (41 bps), while the same covenant reduces spread yield of 
operations loans by only 13% (14 bps).  Our findings are in general consent with other 
studies on loan covenant pricing (e.g., Bradley & Roberts, 2004; Matvos, 2013; Reisel, 
2014; Wei, 2005).  Overall, we observe that restructure loans receive greater price 
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reducing benefits for including additional covenants in loan agreements than operations 
loans.  However, since the financial ratio restriction offers a greater benefit to operations 
loans than restructure loans, we conclude partial support for Hypothesis 4. 
 
4.4.  Loan Purpose, Corporate Governance Attributes, and Debt Contracting Terms 
 In Table 6, we test if banks apply different guiding principles in determining what 
constitutes quality corporate governance based on the expected designated use of a loan.  
Consistent with the literature, we observe that board size has a significant negative effect 
on all contract terms for both restructure and operations samples, thus suggesting that 
lenders look for larger boards regardless of loan purpose (e.g., Anderson et al., 2004; 
Fields et al., 2012).  Conversely, while board independence does not display significant 
influence on restructure loans, it produces a significant negative effect on loan spread and 
fees within operations loans.  Economically, compared to operations loan firms with no 
independent directors, those with 50% of independent directors enjoy lower loan spreads 
and fees by about 9 and 3bps, respectively.  Our finding that board independence has an 
inverse relationship with loan price in operations loans accords with legislature and 
empirical research promoting board independence as an important attribute of board 
efficacy (e.g., Sarbanes and Oxley Act of 2002; Anderson et al., 2004; Rodriguez-
Dominguez, Gallego-Alvarez, and Garcia-Sanchez, 2009).   However, the non-significant 
effect of board independence on loan price of restructure loans also extends extant 
literature.  For example, Gilson (1990) finds that following debt restructure, about 55% of 
board seats are replaced by lenders, thus implying that the pre-existing board structure of 
firms seeking restructure loans carries little influence over loan terms. 
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 In accord with prior literature, we observe that the effect of board busyness does 
not substantially differ between restructure loans and operations loans, with an exception 
to having a lowering effect on commitment fees within the restructure loans sample.29  
Although the relationship between board busyness and restructure loans fees is 
statistically significant, economically it translates to only about 0.05% decrease in fees 
per one-percentage-point increase, or about 2.3% lower commitment fee if the board is 
comprised of 50% busy directors. 
 Directors’ tenure on board represents directorship experience.  Similar to Fields et 
al. (2012), our results in Table 6 suggest that longer directorship tenure decreases price 
components of debt contracting.  Further, our finding that higher levels of expertise on 
the board of directors lead to lower price components of debt contracting for operations 
loans complements prior research studying the benefits that expert directors bring to the 
firm.30  However, board expertise does not appear to have a significant impact on the cost 
of debt for restructure loans.  Nonetheless, Cornelli and Karakas (2008) explain that 
expertise during restructure processes typically comes from private equity firm partners, 
not the internal board of directors. 
 Board diversity is associated with higher firm values, improved information 
transparency, and better oversight of managerial reporting (e.g., Adams & Ferreira, 2009; 
Carter, Simkins, & Simpson, 2003; Gul, Srinidhi, & Ng, 2011; Srinidhi, Gul, & Tsui, 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
29For example, Francis et al. (2012) find a significant negative relationship between multiple directorship 
and loan spread; Fields et al. (2012) report a negative, although insignificant, relationship between the 
percentage of directors with more than four other board appointments and price and non-price costs of debt; 
Bradley and Chen (2011) argue that firms that allow directors to pursue their own interests enjoy lower cost 
of debt. 
30 For example, Xie, Davidson, and DaDalt (2003) find that expertise on the board of directors leads to 
lower levels of earnings management, while Agrawal and Chadha (2005) and Beasley (1996) link 
directorship expertise to lower probability of financial statement fraud. 
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2011).  Our results suggest that female and foreign directors play a more important role in 
operations purpose loans than in restructure loans.  Levi, Li, and Zhang (2013) offer that 
the ambivalent effect of female directors on restructure loan terms may stem from 
women’s reputation of being less aggressive decision makers.  In addition, even though 
foreign directors improve firms’ decision making in international affairs, they are also 
likely less familiar with domestic rules and regulations, thus weakening board’s 
monitoring effectiveness (e.g., Coval & Moskowitz, 2001; Masulis, Wang, & Xie, 2012). 
 Several recent studies find that high levels of shareholder control are undesirable 
to lenders because of the increases in credit risk and expropriation, and thus loan 
contracting terms become less attractive as shareholder control increases (e.g., Chava et 
al., 2009, Fields et al., 2012; Francis et al., 2012).  Our results suggest that even though 
price terms of operations loans increase as board vote power increases, restructure loans 
are not significantly affected.  However, Cremers et al. (2007) find that shareholder 
control is associated with higher (lower) bond yields if the firm is exposed (protected) 
from external control mechanisms.  Lehn and Poulsen (1989), Peyer and Shivdasani 
(2001), and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) assert that firm restructure can be viewed as a 
takeover defense.  Therefore, our finding of significant positive relationship between 
board vote power and cost of debt in operations loans is in agreement with extant 
research. 
 Overall, we determine that firms’ corporate governance structure has a much 
larger impact on operations purpose loans than on restructure loans.  Relying on prior 
literature, we attribute this phenomenon to weaker influence of restructure firms’ boards 
of directors on decision making process during the course of corporate restructure, as 
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well as lower levels of predictability of successful completion of restructure project.31  
Therefore, based on our results presented in Table 6, we conclude that Hypothesis 5 is 
supported. 
 
5.  Robustness and Sensitivity Tests 
 Our analyses assume that the specifications and proxies we utilize adequately 
measure appropriate attributes.  To ensure that our findings are not incidental, we 
perform additional procedures to test for robustness of our tests.  Consistent with prior 
literature, we retest our analyses from Table 3 with alternative measures, mitigate 
potential endogeneity by utilizing exogenous instrumental variables approach, limit our 
sample to firms with no loans within the preceding two years, and test loans with a single 
loan purpose.  We find that our results presented in Table 7 do not significantly change 
due to these tests, thus leading us to conclude that our results are robust and are not 
incidental. 
 In our analyses, we utilize the loan covenant intensity index as a proxy for 
covenant restrictiveness in loan contracts.  However, as we stated previously in the 
discussion of variables section, one of the main limitations of the covenant intensity 
index is its failure to capture covenant tightness.  An alternative approach developed by 
Murfin (2012) approximates the strictness of a loan contract through the ex-ante 
probability of a forced renegotiation between lender and borrower.  The contract 
strictness measure is based on four elements identified in the literature as important 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
31 For example, Denis and Denis (1995) report that 31% of LBO firms in their sample encountered 
financial distress, as well as that proceeds from asset sales following recapitalization often fall short of 
expectations; Peyer and Shivdasani (2001) suggest that following recapitalization, firms more likely to 
engage in riskier investments to raise cash needed to service debt; Gilson (1990) and Harford (2003) find 
that following firm restructure, a large number of incumbent directors are replaced by lenders. 
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components of propensity for borrower’s technical default due to violation of covenant 
restriction:  the number of financial covenants, the initial covenant slack, scaling of 
contractual slack, and covariance between financial covenants.  To calculate contract 
strictness for each loan deal, we compute multivariate cumulative distribution function 
for the slack associated with each of the financial ratio covenants during the first quarter 
of the loan, scaled by variance.32  The cdf follows normal distribution with mean 0 and 
variance ? that is estimated as the covariance matrix of financial ratios in the loan.  To 
ensure that our analyses are not missing important inferences gained from measures of 
covenant tightness, we retest loan covenant models from Table 3 using the Murfin 
contract strictness measure as the dependent variable in place of the Bradley and Roberts 
covenant intensity index measure.  Based on the results presented in Table 7, columns 1 
and 2, we observe that no significant differences exist between the use of the covenant 
intensity index in Table 3 and the covenant strictness measure in Table 7.  Therefore, we 
conclude that for the purposes of the current study, the contract strictness measure does 
not provide additional insights or advantages over the covenant intensity index. 
 Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) argue that empirical studies that use board 
structure as predicting variables typically suffer from endogeneity problems.  However, 
our analyses assume that corporate governance characteristics and debt contracting terms 
are exogenous.  As discussed earlier, we minimize endogeneity concern by constructing 
our sample where the loan cost data for our borrowing firms relate to board and other 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
32 We are indebted to Justin Murfin for sharing a program used to calculate the loan covenant strictness 
measure. 
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characteristics from the previous year.33  Next, consistent with much of the governance 
literature, we use an instrument for board quality in a two-stage least squares model.34  
The approach calls for the use of an instrument for each board characteristic variable.  An 
effective instrumental variable must to be related to the suspected endogenous board 
structure variable, but unrelated to the error terms of the dependent variable (Wooldridge, 
2012).  However, identifying instruments that meet those criteria for each of the ten board 
quality characteristics is a virtually impossible task.  Following a method used by Fields 
et al, (2012), we combine the six negative and statistically significant board quality 
characteristics from column 4 in Table 3 (board size, independence, busyness, tenure, 
female present, and ethnic minority) into a single board quality index by assigning point 
values to each of these variables.  Specifically, a value of 1 is assigned to the variable 
within the index if it is above its cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise.  The resulting 
board quality index has a range from 0 to 6.  Similar to Fields et al. (2012), we use the 
distance between the corporate headquarters of the borrowing firms and the nearest 
medium or large airport hub as an instrument for board quality index.35  Since the 
distance between headquarters and the nearest airport is a measure of the cost to a 
potential director in terms of time and effort required to travel to board meetings, it is 
expected to have an inverse relationship with borrowers’ board quality index.  We report 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
33 Similar lagging techniques are employed by Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) and Fields et al. (2012). 
34For example, Bennedsen, Kongsted, and Nielsen (2008); Fields et al. (2012); Gul and Leung (2004); 
Knyazeva, Knyazeva, and Masulis (2013). 
35 According to Alam, Chen, Ciccotello, and Ryan (2014) and Knyazeva et al. (2013), directors’ proximity 
to the firm affects their effectiveness, and that distance between lenders and borrowers may be an important 
attribute in loan contracting costs. 
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the second stage of the two-stage least squares model in Table 7, columns 3 and 4.36  Our 
results show that the board quality index coefficient has a negative and statistically 
significant effect on loan spread.  Therefore, we conclude that our analyses in this study 
are not substantially affected by endogeneity. 
 To alleviate the risk of reverse causality in our models, we rerun our analysis by 
limiting the sample only to firms that had no loans within the last two years.37  The 
intuition behind this approach is to try to eliminate loans that are part of an ongoing and 
regular borrowing program that could significantly influence the previous year’s board 
quality.  We find that most of the relations from Table 3 are preserved in Table 7, and 
none of the significant coefficients change signs.  Therefore, we conclude that our 
analyses do not suffer from reverse causality. 
 The majority of loan deals reported in DealScan are composed of several tranches 
that can be made for different loan purposes.  However, the debt contracting terms often 
apply to the entire deal, not individual tranches. Given our emphasis on the relation 
between loan purpose and debt contracting terms, a concern arises whether a combination 
of different loan purpose tranches significantly affects loan terms.  To test the legitimacy 
of this concern, we reduce our sample to include only loans with one tranche, thus loans 
made to single purpose.  We find that most of the relationships from Table 3 are retained 
in Table 7.  Therefore, we conclude that our analyses in Tables 3 through 6 are not 
distorted by the compounding effect of multiple loan purposes per loan deal. 
  
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
36 In the first stage of two-stage least squares model, the distance between borrower’s headquarters and the 
nearest airport hub is negatively and statistically significant at below the 1% level. 
37 Similar methods are used by Cheng (2008) and Fields et al. (2012). 
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6.  Conclusion 
 While a great deal of research examines composition and design of loan contracts, 
most of the existing literature on debt contracting applies its findings indiscriminately to 
loans of all purposes without addressing the idiosyncratic differences in credit risk and 
monitoring needs that loans of various specific purposes present.  To address this 
limitation in the literature, our study investigates the relationship between designated 
purpose of bank loans and contracting terms, as well as tests the differential influence of 
borrowers’ corporate governance on loan terms of different purposes. 
 We find that both price and non-price cost of debt terms are influenced by 
designated use of loan proceeds.  Specifically, loans made to finance restructure projects 
(i.e., asset acquisition line, debt repayment, LBO, spinoff, and takeover purposes) are 
more costly than loans designated for operations projects (i.e., CP backup, general 
corporate, and working capital purposes).  The difference in cost of debt is both 
statistically and economically significant.  For example, as similar to Graham et al. 
(2008),  Gupta et al. (2008), and Wittenberg-Moerman (2008), we observe that spread for 
restructure purpose projects is, on average, about 50% higher than spread for operations 
purpose projects, which translates into about 60 bps.  In addition, an average restructure 
purpose loan contains an additional covenant requirement, as compared to operations 
purpose loans.  Further, consistent with Bradley and Roberts (2004) and Reisel (2014), 
we confirm that loan covenants have a reducing effect on loan spread.  Thus, although 
spread yields for restructure purpose loans are significantly higher than those of 
operations loans, restructure loans gain greater benefits from inclusion of security 
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requirement, dividend restriction, and sweep restriction covenants.  However, inclusion 
of financial ratio restrictions offers greater price benefits to operations loan. 
 We also observe that lenders indeed use different standards to assess the quality 
of borrowers’ corporate governance for restructure versus operations loan purposes.  In 
accord with Gilson (1990) and Harford (2003), we find that borrowers’ pre-existent 
corporate governance structure has more influence on loans’ contracting terms for 
operations loans than for restructure loans.  Specifically, while board independence, 
expert directors, female directors, global directors, and directors’ voting power have a 
significant impact on price and /or non-price components of debt cost for operations 
loans, these corporate governance attributes do not have significant effects on loan 
agreement terms for restructure purposes loans. 
 The results of this study indicate that loans’ primary designation of proceeds has a 
much bigger impact on loan contracting terms than previously suggested.  Based on our 
calculations, by failing to account for loan purpose differential, extant literature may be 
misstating loan spread by as much as 182 bps.  In addition, although many prior studies 
have shown a strong relation between quality of corporate governance and more 
favorable loan terms, we find that corporate governance efficacy does not play the same 
alleviating role for loans of all purposes.  As with all research, we recognize this study 
has its limitations which we encourage future research to address. However, by taking a 
modest step in investigating the effects of loan purposes on debt contracting, as well as its 
role in lenders’ assessment of borrowers’ corporate governance as a factor determining 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Summary Statistics on Differences between Restructure and Operations Loans 
 Restructure Operations Diff. (R-O) 
Panel A – Bank loan characteristics 
All in spread drawn (bps) 168.0 106.3 61.66 *** 
Commitment fees (bps) 36.81 30.30 6.51 *** 
Percentage with commitment fees 33.50% 25.81% 7.69% *** 
Covenants (for firms with at least one 
covenant) 
   
  Firms with secured loans (%) 57.89% 42.27% 15.62% *** 
  Firms with dividend restrictions (%) 88.21% 91.77% -3.56% ** 
  Firms > 2 ratio restrictions (%) 48.39% 34.47% 13.92% *** 
  Firms with asset sales sweep (%) 55.74% 29.57% 26.17% *** 
  Firms with debt issue sweep (%) 49.62% 22.13% 27.49% *** 
  Firms with equity issue sweep (%) 42.27% 20.00% 22.27% *** 
Covenant index (for firms with at least one 
covenant) 
3.42 2.40 1.02 *** 
Loan size ($ millions) 534.2 523.24 10.96 
Loan amount to total assets (%) 30.80% 23.44% 7.36% 
Months to maturity 46.82 34.39 12.43 *** 
Number of lenders 11.88 11.94 -0.06 
Investment grade (%) 30.00% 65.54% -35.54% *** 
Panel B – Corporate governance characteristics 
Board size 9.09 10.09 -1.0 *** 
Number of independent directors 5.54 7.01 -1.47 *** 
Proportion of independent directors (%) 60.43% 68.53% -8.10 *** 
Number of busy directors 1.93 2.95 -1.02 *** 
Proportion of busy directors (%) 20.01% 27.72% -7.71 *** 
Proportion of female directors (%) 8.08% 11.03% -2.95% 
Number of financial experts 0.24 0.65 -0.41 *** 
Number of non-financial experts 0.33 0.76 -0.43 *** 
Number of international directors 0.11 0.20 -0.09 *** 
Number of ethnic minority directors 0.32 0.68 -0.36 *** 
Director tenure 9.63 8.49 1.14 
Director age 58.38 59.48 -1.10 *** 
Director stock ownership 7.72% 2.97% 4.75% *** 
G-Index 9.22 9.73 -0.51 *** 
Panel C – Firm financial characteristics 
Total assets ($ millions) 6,416.4 11,114.7 -4,698.3 *** 
Market value of equity ($ millions) 5,924.6 11,685 .1 -5,750.4 *** 
Sales to total assets 1.34 1.81 -0.48 * 
Return on total assets (%) 15.22% 14.11%  1.11% *** 
Long-term debt to total assets (%) 27.72%  24.92%  2.80% *** 
Leverage ratio (%) 61.48% 59.57%  1.91% *** 
Market to book ratio 1.85 1.86  -0.01 
Current ratio 1.84 1.59 0.25 *** 




Effect of Loan Purpose on Loan Contracting Terms 
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Table 3, continued 










Loan and firm financial control variables  


































































































       
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-value 431.28*** 61.97*** 56.50*** 547.24*** 81.65*** 50.22*** 
Adjusted R2 0.7457 0.6016 0.3971 0.7373 0.6020 0.3902 
N 3,816 1,051 1,922 3,729 1,014 1,894 
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Asset Sale, Debt 
Issue, or Equity 
Issue Sweep 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Loan and firm financial control variables 
































































     
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo-R2 0.3694 0.0560 0.1685 0.2663 
N 1,922 1,922 1,922 1,922 





Effect of Covenant Inclusion on Loan Price by Loan Purpose 




































Corporate governance characteristics 

















































 (1) (2) 
Loan and firm financial control variables  
































   
Year dummies Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes 
F-value 21.09*** 46.14*** 
Adjusted R2 0.4301 0.3799 
N 640 1,769 





Effect of Corporate Governance Attributes on Loan Cost by Loan Purpose Categories 
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Loan and firm financial control variables  



































































































Table 6, continued 










 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-value 101.05*** 22.03*** 12.97*** 422.20*** 61.31*** 49.01*** 
Adjusted R2 0.6884 0.5756 0.2733 0.7246 0.5969 0.4004 
N 816 522 574 2,882 2,452 1,295 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ESSAY 2:  DO BUSY DIRECTORS INFLUENCE THE COST OF DEBT?  AN 
EXAMINATION THROUGH THE LENS OF TAKEOVER VULNERABILITY 
 
 We investigate the effects of board busyness on firms’ cost of debt by analyzing 
the relationship through a hostile takeover framework.  Using DealScan database, we 
draw a sample of 2,964 loans from 1,057 unique borrowers for the period between 1999 
and 2006.  First, we establish an inverse relationship between board busyness and firms’ 
hostile takeover vulnerability by implementing the takeover vulnerability index (adapted 
from the Gompers et al. (2003) anti-takeover governance provisions index).  Although 
the link between board busyness and the propensity of a hostile takeover has been 
examined ex post in prior research, the takeover vulnerability index allows us to study the 
relationship ex-ante, while still yielding similar results.  Second, we test the relationship 
between board busyness and cost of debt.  Our results suggest that as the level of board 
busyness increases, the cost of debt decreases.  Economically, the cost of debt for firms 
whose board is comprised of 40% busy directors is about 27 basis points lower compared 
to those without busy directors.  Overall, our results provide important implications to the 





1.  Introduction 
 The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between board busyness38 
and the cost of debt for a sample of private loan issues.  Extant research documents that 
creditors recognize and reward borrowers with board characteristics, such as 
independence, expertise, and diversity, by offering favorable loan terms because such 
firms pose fewer risks of default on a loan.39 However, the effect of board busyness on 
bondholders has been largely ignored, even though board busyness received significant 
attention for its impact on firm performance, and thus its effect on shareholders (e.g., 
Ferris, Jagannathan, & Pritchard, 2003; Fich & Shivdasani, 2006).   Therefore, to gain a 
more global understanding of the board busyness characteristic, as well as its role in the 
overall board composition, it is important to analyze board busyness in the context of 
lending agreements. 
 Much of the extant board busyness literature focuses on its negative effect on firm 
performance.40  However, along a less traveled path, evidence suggests that lenders may 
be less perturbed by the negative aspects of board busyness than shareholders, and may 
even indicate preference for boards with busy directors in the form of lending agreements 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
38 Board busyness refers to the percentage of the board of directors’ members who hold additional outside 
board appointments at other major firms.  According to the U.S. Council of Institutional Investors’ 
Corporate Governance Policies (2009), directors who serve on more than two additional boards of for-
profit corporations are classified as “busy.” 
39 For example, Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb (2004) find that firms with large and independent boards enjoy 
narrower yield spreads; Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and LaFond (2006) link strong boards (independent, 
with high levels of stock ownership and high levels of expertise) with high credit ratings; and more 
recently, Fields, Fraser, and Subrahmanyam (2012) suggest that firms with quality boards of directors 
(specifically, independent, diverse, and with low CEO ownership) have fewer financial ratio covenant 
restrictions included in debt contracts. 
40Fich and Shivdasani (2006), as well as Core, Holthausen, and Larker (1999), Shivdasani and Yermack 
(1999), and Jiraporn, Kim, and Davidson (2008) provide evidence that the monitoring ability of directors 
with multiple appointments decreases and the firm performance suffers because busy directors are 
distracted and are not able to devote sufficient attention to a given firm. 
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with lower cost of debt terms.  In particular, using actual takeover bids to construct the 
probability of a hostile takeover, Shivdasani (1993) shows that firms whose outside 
directors hold fewer additional directorships are more likely to be identified as hostile 
takeover targets.  Further, several other studies link lower takeover vulnerability to a 
lower cost of debt (e.g., Klock, Mansi, & Maxwell, 2005; Cremers, Nair, & Wei, 2007).  
However, even though an inverse relationship between board busyness and the cost of 
debt is implied through these separate streams of research, to our knowledge this 
connection has not been formally established.  Therefore, we investigate if board 
busyness indeed lowers the cost of debt, or if the link implied in the literature is merely 
incidental. 
 We address the purpose of this study through the hostile takeover framework.  We 
choose the takeover setting because it is the common denominator between the board 
busyness and the cost of debt streams of research, thus allowing for easier comparison of 
our results to those of extant research studies (e.g., Shivdasani, 1993; Klock et al., 2005; 
Cremers et al., 2007).  In addition, although hostile takeovers tend to increase 
shareholders’ wealth, the interests of both the busy directors and lenders are aligned on 
the issue of avoiding takeovers.  Specifically, takeover is undesired by busy directors 
because association with a takeover target typically damages their directorship 
reputation41 and, thereby, causes a potential loss of lucrative42 current and/or future 
additional outside directorship opportunities.  Takeovers are detrimental to creditors as 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
41The reputation hypothesis asserts that busy directors have an incentive to avoid serving on boards of firms 
that may be takeover targets because association with such firms damages their directorship reputations to 
the point where their current and/or future directorship appointments may be lost (e.g., Harford, 2003; 
Wang, Sahr, Ning, & Davidson, 2010). 
42 According to the NACD Director Compensation Report for 2009, the median directorship compensation 
ranged between $75,490 for directors in smaller firms and $216,186 for directors in the top 200 firms.   
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well, due to the potential negative consequences of a takeover for the target firm, such as 
increased credit risk,43 higher probability of loan default and bankruptcy filing as a result 
of elevated levels of debt,44 and possible reordering of priority claims in the event of 
bankruptcy.45 
 Using a sample of 2,964 private loans from the DealScan database of detailed 
loan information for the period between 1999 and 2006, we address the purpose of this 
study with a two-prong approach.  First, we build on Shivdasani (1993) study to test if the 
takeover vulnerability index46 is an appropriate tool to measure the likelihood of a 
takeover.  Specifically, we include similar control variables, but substitute Shivdasani’s 
dichotomous dependent variable measure (1 if a firm is a hostile takeover target, and 0 
otherwise) with the takeover vulnerability index.  Although Shivdasani’s dichotomous 
takeover target variable is a more precise statistical measure, it can only be applied ex 
post, since it requires an actual placement of a hostile takeover bid for a firm to be 
classified as a takeover target.  On the contrary, the takeover vulnerability index is able to 
measure the likelihood of a takeover ex-ante, because it allows for identification of a 
potential takeover target before the actual bid is made.  Second, after controlling for 
takeover vulnerability, we examine the relationship between board busyness and the cost 
of debt. 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
43 According to Billet, King, and Mauer (2004), takeovers are often accompanied by an increase in asset 
risk or reduction in credit rating of the target firm, thus increasing credit risk. 
44For example, Kim and McConnell (1977), Cook and Martin (1991), Warga and Welch (1993) and Ghosh 
and Jain (2000) report that target firms experience significant leverage increases after a takeover. 
45 According to Franks and Torous (1989), Weiss (1990), and Eberhart, Moore, and Roenfeldt (1990), even 
if priority covenants are in place to prevent the firm from issuing bonds of equal or higher seniority, these 
rules are not always upheld in the case of financial distress, such as hostile takeover. 
46 The takeover vulnerability index is the inverse of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) governance index, 
and thus measures the firm’s exposure to takeover risk.  The takeover vulnerability index has been used in 
extant research studies, such as Chava, Livdan, and Purnanandam (2009). 
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 Our results are consistent with previous research studies, suggesting that busy 
directors are prone to take actions to help prevent takeovers of their firms (e.g., Gilson, 
1990; Shivdasani, 1993).  We find support for this relationship even though we use the 
takeover vulnerability index (an ex-ante measure) to determine the likelihood of a firm’s 
takeover, as compared to Shivdasani’s (1993) dichotomous takeover target variable (an 
ex post measure).  Thus, we conclude that the takeover vulnerability index is a valid 
measure of a firm’s propensity to becoming a takeover target.  We find that busy 
directors are most strongly associated with takeover provision categories that are 
designed to delay and protect against takeover bids. 
 Next, we find that indeed board busyness has a negative relationship with the cost 
of debt, even after controlling for other board composition, loan, and borrower financial 
characteristics.  These results indicate that contrary to much of the extant research47 
suggesting that busy directors hinder firm performance, and are thereby detrimental to 
their firms, we find support that busy directors are instrumental in reducing credit risk, 
and thus are an important and beneficial component of board composition in lowering the 
firm’s cost of debt.  Specifically, our results point to over 27 basis points decrease in the 
cost of debt for firms whose board composition consists of at least 40% busy directors.  
Similarly, firms with at least four busy directors or three busy independent directors 
enjoy cost of debt that is about 18 and 14 basis points lower, respectively, than their 
counterparts without busy directors.  To ensure that our findings are not driven by other 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
47 See, for example, Core et al. (1999), Fich and Shivdasani (2006), Jirapornet al, (2008) and Shivdasani 




factors, we performed a series of robustness tests and conclude that our findings are 
robust. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 will discuss 
relevant literature to develop testable hypotheses.  Section 3 will describe the data and 
give summary statistics.  Section 4 will provide analyses that test the main research 
questions of the study.  Section 5 will examine our results for robustness.  Section 6 will 
present a summary of the findings and our concluding remarks. 
 
2.  Background Literature 
 
2.1.  Agency Conflicts 
 Modern-day firms depend on both outside equity and debt claims for their capital 
needs for growth and expansion.  For example, in 2011, U.S. domiciled corporations 
raised more than $1 trillion of new external capital, of which almost 88% was some form 
of debt financing (i.e., bonds, syndicated debt, or other types of loans).48  However, 
according to the agency theory, firms that use both sources of capital are faced with 
conflicting interests among the equity holders, managers, and debt holders (e.g., Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986; Harris & Raviv, 1990; Stulz, 1990; Armstrong, Guay, & 
Weber, 2010).  Focusing on the relationship between equity holders and debt holders, 
literature states that one of the main sources of conflict is asset misappropriation of debt 
holders’ monies into risky and negative net present value (NPV) projects (e.g., Harris & 
Raviv, 1991; Blanchard, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1994; Richardson, 2006; 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 




Armstrong et al., 2010).  Specifically, debt holders prefer for the firm to invest debt 
capital into low-risk projects to increase the probability that, in the event of project 
failure, the investment is recovered.  Equity holders, on the other hand, have an incentive 
to invest debt capital into high-risk projects because they profit if the project succeeds; if 
the project fails, however, the majority of the cost is borne by the debt holders. 
 Another major source of dissent between equity holders and debt holders is the 
use of “disciplinary” hostile takeovers49 (e.g. Gompers et al., 2003; Cremers et al., 2007).  
Equity holders are receptive to the use of a takeover because it strengthens the firm’s 
shareholder control (e.g., Jensen, 1988; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986).  Since equity holders 
are concerned with wealth maximization, if the firm fails to perform as expected, they 
have an incentive to “discipline” the firm’s existing management by replacing/controlling 
it with a management team of another firm through a hostile takeover.50  By engulfing the 
takeover target firm, the bidding firm is able to eliminate many of the inefficiencies and 
create positive synergies that increase the value of the stock for equity holders of both 
previously separate firms (McConnell & Nantell, 1985; Jensen & Ruback, 1983; 
Goergen & Renneboog, 2004). 
 Debt holders, on the other hand, prefer to avoid lending to firms with a high 
likelihood of becoming a takeover target because the increased credit risks typically 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
49According to Shleifer and Vishny (1997), takeovers are rapid-fire mechanisms for owner concentration.  
“In a typical hostile takeover, a bidder makes a tender offer to the dispersed shareholders of the target firm, 
and if they accept this offer, acquires control of the target firm and so can replace, or at least control, the 
management.” (p.756)?
50 Although hostile takeovers are not as prevalent in 2000’s as they were in the 1980’s, takeover bidders 
such as the shareholder activist Carl Icahn still watch for firms with weak corporate governance for a 
potential takeover opportunity. 
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outweigh the potential profitable outcomes.51  According to Billet et al. (2004), even 
though the below-investment-grade target bonds earn positive returns upon the takeover 
announcement, investment-grade target bonds experience negative returns.  Further, by 
lending to a firm with a high probability of a takeover, debt holders face an increased 
level of credit risk due to an increase in asset risk or a reduction in the credit rating of the 
target firm.  It is also not uncommon for target firms to experience significant leverage 
increases after a takeover, thus increasing the probability of loan default and bankruptcy 
filing (Kim & McConnell, 1977; Cook & Martin, 1991; Warga & Welch, 1993; Ghosh & 
Jain, 2000).  Finally, lenders face the risk of potential reordering of priority claims, even 
if priority claims are in place to prevent the target firm from issuing bonds of equal or 
higher seniority, because these rules are not always upheld in the case of financial 
distress (Franks & Torous, 1989; Weiss, 1990; Eberhartet al., 1990). 
 
2.2.  Board Busyness 
 Corporate governance consists of several crucial components that are necessary 
for successful operation of the firm and its relationships with both the direct and indirect 
stakeholders.  One of the most important components of strong corporate governance is 
an effective board of directors.  According to the Business Roundtable Principles of 
Corporate Governance (2010), “the paramount duty of the board of directors of a public 
corporation is to select a Chief Executive Officer and to oversee the CEO and other 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
51 This statement is not meant to imply that lenders do not value profitable firms.  Instead, debt holders tend 
to mitigate profitability risks by relying on loan covenants, which according to Rajan and Winton (1995) 
are “clauses in a loan contract that require the borrower to take or refrain from various actions” (p.1113).  
Covenants vary substantially in their designated restrictions, such as requiring collateral, restricting 
dividend payouts, imposing thresholds on financial data, and forcing early retirement of the loan in the 
event that the firm sells excessive amount of assets or issues additional capital either through debt or equity 
(Bradley & Roberts, 2004). 
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senior management in the competent and ethical operation of the corporation on a day-to-
day basis” (p. 3).  However, the board of directors governing bodies provide limited 
regulation with regards to specific guidance on how directors are expected to perform 
their job.  Further, the composition of the board of directors is generally also open to 
interpretation.  For example, it is not clear whether the board is more effective when it is 
large or small (e.g., Boone, Field, Karpoff, & Raheja, 2007; Coles, Daniel, & Naveen, 
2008), diverse or uniform (e.g., Carter, Simkins, & Simpson, 2003; Masulis, Wang, & 
Xie, 2012), and whether it is better for directors to own many stock shares versus few 
shares (e.g., Ahmed & Duellman, 2007; Cremers et al., 2007).  In addition, recently a 
new controversial dimension of board composition has emerged in the literature – board 
busyness.52 
 There has been a great deal of debate on whether busy boards are effective in 
accomplishing their directorship tasks.  Ferris et al. (2003) investigate the relationship 
between busy boards and firm performance and find that firm performance does not 
suffer when guided by busy directors.  In fact, in some cases they even report a positive 
relationship between a firm’s performance and the additional directorships acquired by its 
board members.  Using several indirect tests, Ferris et al. conclude that busy directors 
devote sufficient time to their duties and do not shirk on their responsibilities.53 Ferris et 
al.'s findings have been echoed by Harris and Shimizu (2004), Kaplan and Reishus 
(1990), and Booth and Deli (1996).  These authors explain their results as a function of 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
52Fich and Shivdasani (2006) define firm’s board of directors as “busy” if the majority of that board’s 
directors serve of three or more boards.  By extending this definition, we refer to directors who serve on 
three or more boards as “busy directors.” 
53Specifically, Ferris et al. (2003) determined that busy directors are equally likely to serve on committees 
as non-busy directors, and are not more likely to be sued than non-busy directors.  From these tests they 
drew conclusions that busy directors are equally involved in board matters as non-busy directors. 
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high quality directors who are able to multi-task and possess extensive levels of 
knowledge and experience that they share with their management team to help the firm 
achieve its goals. 
 However, the stance of Ferris et al. (2003) and the other studies with similar 
results that support positive relationship between firm performance and busy boards has 
been challenged by Fich and Shivdasani (2006).  Fich and Shivdasani identified 
methodological weaknesses in the Ferris et al. study, which they conclude are interfering 
with the results reported by those authors.  By using more direct and robust tests, Fich 
and Shivdasani are able to show that busy directors are, in fact, less effective in 
performing their duties, and as a result, busy boards are not effective monitors of 
management’s activities.54  Nevertheless, some studies, such as Chakravarty, Marisetty, 
and Veeraraghavan (2009), find that even when using direct and robust tests similar to 
Fich and Shivdasani, there are certain settings and conditions (such as the presence of 
institutional voids in emergent economies) under which board busyness has a positive 
relationship on firm performance.55 Further, Field, Lowry, and Mkrtchyan (2013) find 
that busy directors are a desirable feature among smaller and newer firms looking to 
launch an IPO. 
 Although one of the primary duties of the board of directors involves representing 
the equity holders in overseeing the firm’s management’s operation of the firm, they 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
54Fich and Shivdasani (2006) find that firms with busy boards have lower market-to-book ratios than firms 
with non-busy boards; firms with busy boards have lower sensitivity of CEO turnover to performance; and 
stock prices increase when busy directors cease their directorship, but decrease when a busy director is 
elected. 
55Chakravarty et al. (2011) find that in emergent economies standalone firms are more likely to lack 
institutional affiliation, and that busy outside directors (with high qualifications and legal or accounting 
experience) are able to fill the institutional void by bringing “reputational capital” to the board with them. 
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typically do not share the equity holders’ enthusiasm at the prospect of a takeover.  
According to Harford (2003), target firm directors are seldom retained following the 
completion of the takeover.  This phenomenon is even more pronounced among busy 
directors, primarily due to the reputation hypothesis, which asserts that busy directors 
have an incentive to avoid serving on boards of takeover targets because association with 
such firms damages their directorship reputations (e.g., Yermack, 2004; Fich & 
Shivdasani, 2007; and Wang et al., 2010).  Further, Shivdasani (1993) finds that 
compared to when outside directors hold two additional directorships, as the number of 
additional directorships approaches zero, the likelihood of a takeover more than doubles.  
In addition, a hostile takeover on their watch signals that they are poor directors and 
inefficient monitors, which jeopardizes their current and/or future directorship 
appointments.  Since busy directors have more than one lucrative appointment at stake if 
their reputation is damaged, they are more likely to pass anti-takeover provisions 
designed to protect against and/or delay takeovers (e.g. Loh, 1994; Fields & Keys, 2003; 
Harford, 2003; Wang et al., 2010).  As a result, firms with busy directors are more likely 
to have stronger anti-takeover provisions in place, and thus are less likely to become a 
hostile takeover target. 
 Even though the general consensus concerning busy directors is that they hinder 
firm performance (and thus, the equity holders’ returns) due to their distracted behavior,56 
Cremers et al. (2007) find that not all corporate governance characteristics involving the 
board of directors have the same effect on creditors as they have on the equity holders.  
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
56 According to surveys by the National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD), a single directorship 
required an average commitment of 228 hours in 2011. 
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For example, strong shareholder control is desired by the equity holders to maximize 
their wealth, while debt holders have a strong preference for weak shareholder control to 
minimize the asset substitution problem.  In addition, Bradley and Chen (2011) find that 
firms that shield their directors from potential litigation, and thereby allow directors to 
pursue their own interests, enjoy a lower cost of debt.57  Bradley and Chen attribute the 
relationship between directors’ litigation protection and firm’s cost of debt to lower 
shareholder control, since lower shareholder control reduces the risk of asset substitution 
which favors the lenders.  Similarly, we expect that firms whose directors hold additional 
directorship appointments with other firms will also enjoy reduced levels of the cost of 
debt because busy directors are more likely to pursue their personal agendas, in addition 
to representing the equity holders, and thereby weaken shareholder control of the firm.  
Further, although the direct monitoring abilities of busy directors are shown to be 
impaired due to multiple-firm distractions,58 they bring other valuable attributes to the 
board of directors, such as demanding higher quality external audits (Carcello, 
Hermanson, Neal, & Riley, 2002), provide multi-dimensional experience and expertise 
(Harris and Shimizu, 2004), and share knowledge of the corporate framework 
(Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Perry & Peyer, 2005).  Given that these qualities of busy 
directors appeal to lenders, the benefits of busy boards may outweigh the risk of 




57 Further, Bradley and Chen (2011) argue that the benefits of the reduced cost of debt often outweigh the 
costs of directorial shirking and suboptimal corporate policies, thus discouraging equity holders from 
enforcing too much shareholder control.   
58 See for example, Core et al. (1999), Shivdasani and Yermack (1999), Fich and Shivdasani (2006), and 
Jirapornet al. (2008). 
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2.3.  Development of Testable Hypotheses 
 Based on the literature discussed in the sections above, we present the following 
hypotheses that we formally test in this study.  First, we examine the linkage between 
board busyness and takeover vulnerability, as suggested by the directorship reputation 
hypothesis, to ensure that the takeover vulnerability index is a valid measure of takeover 
propensity.  This step is important in establishing that busy directors take specific 
precautions (i.e., pass anti-takeover provisions) in order to avoid potential damage to 
their directorship reputation.  Thus, we propose an inverse relationship between board 
busyness and takeover vulnerability defined in the sense of Gompers et al. (2003). 
Accordingly, our first hypothesis is formally stated as follows. 
 
Hypothesis 1:  Firms with busy boards will have a lower level of takeover 
vulnerability. 
 
 Next, we proceed with testing the hypothesis to address the main question and 
purpose of our study.  Specifically, we test the relationship between board busyness and 
the cost of debt.  Based on the above discussed literature, we propose an inverse 
relationship between board busyness and cost of debt in a firm.  Formally, we 
hypothesize the following: 
 
Hypothesis 2:  Firms with busy boards will have lower cost of debt than 





3.  Data Description 
 
3.1.  Empirical Model 
 Based on our review of literature and our proposed hypothesis, the empirical 
model for the main question of our study is specified as follows: 
 
Cost of Debti,t = ?0 +?1(Board Busynessi,t) + ?2(Takeover Vulnerabilityi,t)  
+ ?3(FinancialControlsi,t) + ?4(Loan Controlsi,t) 
+ ?5(Governance Controlsi,t) + ?6(Time Dummyi,t)  
+ ?7(Industry Dummyi,t) + ?i,t (1) 
 
3.2.  The Sample 
 To test our hypotheses, we compile data using the DealScan, Compustat, and 
RiskMetrics databases.  We obtain the terms of bank loan agreements from DealScan, a 
database created and marketed by Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC).  The database 
contains detailed loan information for U.S. and foreign commercial loans made to 
corporations and government entities during the period January 1999 to December 2006.  
According to LPC, approximately half of the loan data are from SEC filings (13Ds, 14Ds, 
13Es, 10Ks, 10Qs, 8Ks, and registration statements).  The other half are obtained from 
contacts within the credit history and from borrowers, lenders, and the credit industry at 
large. 
 Within the detailed loan agreement information from DealScan, we remove data 
for entries of financial institutions (SIC codes 6000-6999).  Using the reduced DealScan 
sample, we match it to the Compustat database to obtain financial information for each 
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firm for the fiscal year preceding the loan agreement.  We acquire information on the 
board of directors from the RiskMetrics database.  Specifically, compared to loan 
contracting data, we lag all board composition variables by one year.  Finally, we use the 
built-in anti-takeover governance provisions index in RiskMetrics, as developed by 
Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick (2003), to assess the takeover vulnerability for each firm at the 
time of the loan agreement.  The resulting overall loan sample includes 2,964 loans from 
1,057 unique borrowers. 
 
3.3.  Board Endogeneity 
 As with other research on board of directors’ composition, this study is not 
exempt from the potential endogeneity problems (see, for example, Hermalin & 
Weisbach, 2001).  Under the assumption of endogeneity, an argument can be made that 
instead of the hypothesized relationship of board busyness variables affecting the firm’s 
cost of debt, the causality between the independent variables of interest and the 
dependent variable may be reversible.  However, given that the board composition 
variables, including board busyness, are lagged by one year, it would indicate that the 
board structure was already established before the lender finalized the cost of debt terms.  
This simple observation, which is consistent with the argument provided by Bradley and 
Chen (2011) and Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), should alleviate much of the concern 
regarding endogeneity, especially the issue of reverse causality.  In addition, we conduct 
the a two-stage least squares analysis in the robustness section, and conclude that the risk 





3.4.  Description of Variables 
 Our dependent variable, the Cost of Debt, is the All-in-Spread-Drawn category 
within Dealscan that represents the borrowing cost per each dollar of the loan drawn.  It 
is calculated as a basis point markup over the 6-month LIBOR, plus any recurring fees 
associated with the lending facility.  Similar measures for cost of debt have been utilized 
in extant literature, both using the Dealscan private loan database (e.g., Chava et al., 
2009; Demiroglu & James, 2010) and other public and private loan databases (e.g., 
Anderson et al., 2004; Bradley & Chen, 2011). 
 The independent variable of interest, Board Busyness, is studied using six proxy 
variables.  These proxy variables are adapted/modified59 from previous literature on busy 
boards (e.g., Chakravarty et al., 2011; Ferris et al., 2003; Fich & Shivdasani, 2006; Field 
et al., 2013).  Using the RiskMetrics database, we define a busy director as a director who 
serves on the board of at least three major for-profit firms.60  Based on this definition of a 
busy director, we calculate # of Busy Directors as the natural log of all busy directors 
who serve on the board of a given firm in our sample.  % of Busy Directors is calculated 
as the ratio of busy directors to total number of directors on board.  Majority of Board 
Busy is a binary variable that equals 1 if busy directors hold at least 50% of the board’s 
seats, and 0 otherwise.  As an alternative measure, which is more consistent with extant 
research on board busyness, we also define busy independent director as an independent 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
59In addition to studying the effects of board busyness concerning busy independent directors, we also want 
to determine if similar results emerge for models where board busyness variables are not limited only to 
independent directors serving on multiple boards, but instead include all busy directors regardless of their 
independence status. 
60 This definition is consistent with the U.S. Council of Institutional Investors’ Corporate Governance 
Policies (2009).  Note that, unlike the majority of extant research on busy boards, this definition of busy 
director does not require director independence. 
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director who sits on the board of at least three major for-profit firms.  Therefore, the # of 
Busy Independent Directors variable is calculated as the natural log of total number busy 
independent directors.  % of Busy Independent Directors is the percentage of busy 
independent directors to total number of directors on board.  Majority of Independent 
Directors Busy is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if busy independent directors 
hold at least 50% of the board’s seats, and 0 otherwise. 
 The Takeover Vulnerability variable is based on the governance index developed 
by Gompers et al. (2003), which is composed of 24 anti-takeover governance provisions.  
Specifically, as suggested by Chava et al. (2009), we use the inverse of Gompers et al. 
governance index provided in RiskMetrics database to calculate our Takeover 
Vulnerability index.  In accord to Gompers et al. (2003) and Chava et al. (2009), we also 
measure firm’s vulnerability to a takeover using two binary variables: Democracy and 
Dictatorship portfolios.  The Democracy portfolio consists of the top decile of the 
Takeover Vulnerability index (Takeover Vulnerability ? 19), and represents firms with 
the fewest anti-takeover governance provisions.  Thus, firms in the Democracy portfolio 
are deemed most vulnerable to takeovers.  The Dictatorship portfolio consists of firms on 
the bottom decile of the Takeover Vulnerability index (Takeover Vulnerability ? 10).  
Thus, firms in the Dictatorship portfolio are expected to be least vulnerable to takeovers. 
 Consistent with extant literature, we include the following financial control 
variables:  Market Capitalization, Book Leverage, Market-to-Book ratio, and Earnings-
to-Assets ratio.61  We calculate Market Capitalization by multiplying the firm’s total 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 




outstanding common stock shares, as reported in the quarterly SEC filing reports, by the 
price of that stock on the last day of the respective quarter.  Book Leverage is the ratio of 
total debt held by the firm to total assets.  Market-to-Book is the ratio of book assets 
minus book equity plus market equity to book assets.  Earnings-to-Assets is the ratio of 
EBITDA to total assets. 
 To control for loan characteristics, we employ firms’ credit ratings and debt 
maturity.  Credit rating is determined using two proxy variables:  Debt Rating and 
Investment Grade dummy.  Debt Rating is calculated based on Standard & Poor’s long-
term domestic issuer credit rating of the borrowing firm.  Specifically, firms with the 
highest possible S&P credit ranking of AAA are assigned a value of 7, AA convert to 6, 
A to 5, BBB to 4, BB to 3, B to 2, and CCC to 1.  Investment Grade is a dummy variable 
that takes a value of 1 if the firm received S&P credit rating of BBB or higher, and 0 if 
the firm was rated below BBB.  Maturity is natural log of the number months that 
represent the duration of the loan. 
 To control for board of directors’ composition, we include the following variables 
in our model:  board independence, board size, directors’ voting power, director’s tenure 
on board, and directors’ age.  By reviewing directors’ affiliation category in the 
RiskMetrics database, we classify directors who are coded as “independent” by 
RiskMetrics as independent, and all others as insiders.  Based on these specifications, we 
measure board independence using two proxy variables:  % of Independent Directors and 
Majority of Board Independent.62% of Independent Directors is the ratio of independent 
directors to total number of directors on the board.  Majority of Board Independent is a 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
62 Similar proxies were used by Anderson et al. (2004) and Klein (2002) to measure board independence. 
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binary variable that equals 1 if independent directors hold at least 50% of the board’s 
seats, and 0 otherwise. 
 Our measure of the number of directors on board consists of three proxies adapted 
from prior literature.  The first proxy, which is commonly used in the literature,63 is the 
natural log of the total number of directors serving on the board, denoted as Board Size.  
The second and third measures of the number of directors on board have been developed 
by Anderson et al. (2004).  Specifically, these proxies use binary variables that classify 
boards as either Large Board (top quartile of board size) or Small Board (bottom quartile 
of board size), respectively.64  To control for the equity in the firm held by directors, we 
adapt the method used by Bhagat, Carey, and Elson (1999) and Henry (2011) as a guide 
to calculate Voting Power, defined as the combined percentage of outstanding stock 
shares held by all directors serving on the board.  Board Tenure is calculated as the sum 
of the number of years that the directors served on the board divided by the total number 
of directors.  Directors’ Age is the sum of all directors’ ages divided by the total number 
of directors. 
 
3.5.  Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 1 presents the overall summary statistics for board composition, loan, and 
borrower characteristics.  We find that, on average, the board of directors is composed of 
slightly fewer than 10 directors.  An average director in our sample holds about 2 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
63For example, Vafeas (2000), Klein (2002), Hermalin and Weisbach (2003), Boone et al. (2007), and 
Coles et al. (2008). 
64 Based on our data, the top quartile of board size consists of at least 11 directors; therefore, Large Board 
equals 1 if the board is comprised of 11 or more directors, and 0 otherwise.  Similarly, the bottom quartile 
of board size consists of at most 8 directors; therefore, Small Board equals 1 if the board is comprised of 8 
or fewer directors, and 0 otherwise. 
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directorship seats, which is consistent with other studies (e.g., Ferris et al., 2003; Jiraporn 
et al., 2008).  Busy directors make up about 26% of a board and about 16% of all boards 
in our sample are classified as busy.  Similar to Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) and 
Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003), we find that independent directors, on average, make up 
around 69% of the total number of directors  and about 88% of firms in our sample have 
independent boards of directors.  A typical director is about 60 years old and has served 
on the board of a given firm for almost 10 years.  The mean takeover vulnerability score 
is slightly over 14, and consistent with Chava et al. (2009) and Gompers et al. (2003), 
about 5% of firms in our sample fall into the Democracy portfolio and about 6% fall into 
the Dictatorship portfolio. 
 The average Cost of Debt variable in our sample is 106 basis points, which is 
similar to Anderson et al. (2004), Bradley and Chen (2011), and Demiroglu and James 
(2010).  We find that only about 27% of firms are constricted by at least one financial 
covenant; however, financial covenants are not common, as indicated by a median score 
of 0.  Further, we identify that the average firm is slightly over the Investment Grade 
level with a debt rating score of 4.03, the loan maturity is almost 41 months with about 
10 lenders per loan.  Over 41% of loans in our sample are secured with collateral, and, on 
average, the loan represents about 31% of the firm’s total assets. 
 The borrower characteristics in our sample are consistent with prior literature, 
such as Anderson et al. (2004), Chava et al. (2009), and Jiraporn et al. (2008).  
Specifically, the average market capitalization value per firm is about $11,153 million, 
total assets value about $10,984 million, book leverage is about 59%, market-to-book 
ratio is 1.89, and earnings-to-assets ratio is about 3.5%. 
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4.  Results 
 
4.1.  Board Busyness and Takeover Vulnerability 
 In our quest to test Hypothesis 1, to determine if firms with busy boards 
experience lower levels of takeover vulnerability, we begin by examining correlation 
statistics between the individual components of takeover vulnerability index and the six 
proxy measures of board busyness.  As shown in Table 2, board busyness is positively 
and statistically significant for every category65 within the takeover vulnerability index.66  
Consistent with Bradley and Chen (2011), boards with busy directors appear to have an 
especially strong and positive relationship within the Delay (blank check, special 
meeting, and written consent provisions) and Protection (compensation plans, contracts, 
golden parachutes, directors indemnification, and directors liability provisions) 
categories.  In addition, boards with busy directors exhibit a strong positive relationship 
with the bylaws and charter and secret ballot provisions within the Voting category, as 
well as anti-greenmail, fair price, pension parachutes, and silver parachutes provisions 
within the Other category.  Out of 24 provisions in the takeover vulnerability index, only 
five provisions have a statistically significant negative relationship with board busyness:  
cumulative voting, unequal voting, directors’ duties, poison pill, and control-share 
acquisition law.  However, correlation values for these provisions are relatively low, 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
65 The takeover vulnerability index categories (Delay, Protection, Voting, Other, and State) were adapted 
from Gompers et al. (2003) anti-takeover Governance Index. 
66 Detailed description of each of the 24 provisions can be found in Appendix 1 (pp. 145-150) of Gompers 
et al. (2003) study on development of their anti-takeover Governance Index. 
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ranging from -0.01 to -0.07.  Further, these provisions are mostly designed for 
strengthening shareholders’ rights, rather than preventing a potential takeover of a firm.67 
 We also review correlations between board busyness and the 
democracy/dictatorship portfolio classifications of a firm.  As expected, we find that the 
relationship between board busyness and firms that fall into the democracy classification 
portfolio is negative and highly significant, while the relationship between firms that fall 
into the dictatorship classification is positive and statistically significant.  Therefore, 
based on the results presented in Table 2, a pattern of strong positive associations 
between board busyness and the presence of takeover vulnerability components is 
observed. 
 To test the relationship between board busyness and firm’s takeover vulnerability 
in a multivariate setting, we run a series of Poisson maximum likelihood estimations in 
Table 3.  Poisson regression is an appropriate statistical method to estimate our dependent 
variable, Takeover Vulnerability Index, because it counts the number of anti-takeover 
provision occurrences in each firm within our sample.  In our analyses, we use robust 
standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level to minimize the potential effects 
of heteroskedasticity.  Further, we include year and industry dummy variables to control 
for possible time and industry effects. 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
67For example, the cumulative voting provision helps minority shareholders to elect directors by allowing 
them to concentrate their votes; unequal voting rights limit the voting rights of some shareholders (e.g., 
those who have exceeded a predetermined threshold of ownership) and expand the voting rights of others 
(e.g., those who have held the stock for a longer period of time); directors’ duties provision allows directors 
to consider stakeholders other than shareholders when considering a merger; poison pills typically give the 
shareholders of the target’s stock other than the bidder the right to purchase stock in the target or the 
bidder’s firm at a deep discount, thus making the target unattractive for a takeover; and control-share 
acquisition laws require a majority of disinterested shareholders to vote on whether a newly qualifying 
large shareholder has voting rights (Gompers et al. (2003)). 
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 Results of Poisson regression presented in Table 3 confirm our expectations stated 
in Hypothesis 1, as well as the correlation statistics in Table 2.  Specifically, we find that 
all six proxy measures of board busyness have a negative and statistically significant 
effect on the takeover vulnerability index, even in the presence of other board 
composition, loan, and borrower characteristics as control variables.  Therefore, we 
conclude that firms with busy directors indeed are more likely to experience lower levels 
of takeover vulnerability than those without busy directors, thus supporting Hypothesis 1.  
Further, since our results are consistent with Shivdasani (1993), even though our 
dependent variable is based on ex-ante data, as compared to ex post data, we conclude 
that the takeover vulnerability index is a valid proxy measure to estimate the likelihood of 
a firm becoming a takeover target. 
 
4.2.  Board Busyness and Cost of Debt 
 To test the effect of board busyness on firms’ cost of debt, we begin with a trend 
analysis by partitioning our board busyness measures into equal increments and 
examining how the cost of debt changes with each increasing increment category.  As 
presented in Table 4, Panel A, we break the % of Busy Directors and % of Busy 
Independent Directors into 10% segment categories:  below 10%, 10-19.99%, 20-
29.99%, etcetera.  For each segment we document the number of firms, the percentage of 
total firms that fall into that category, and the average cost of debt for those firms.  We 
find that, in general, as the percentage of busy directors increases, the average cost of 
debt decreases.  Further, when using the % of Busy Directors proxy measure for board 
busyness, we discover that the cost of debt significantly decreases when the board is at 
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least 40% busy, while when using the % of Busy Independent Directors measure, the cost 
of debt falls below the average 106 basis points level when the board is comprised of at 
least 30% of busy independent directors.  Therefore, it is important to note that the 
traditional definition of busy board as having at least 50% of independent directors hold 
three or more directorship positions does not appear to be a prerequisite for reaping the 
benefits of a lower cost of debt (e.g., Ferris et al., 2003; Fich & Shivdasani, 2006; Field et 
al., 2013). 
 In Panel B of Table 4, we show how the cost of debt is affected when a firm adds 
an additional busy director to the board.  Specifically, we create a separate category based 
on how many busy directors are present on each board.  Using both, the # of Busy 
Directors and # of Busy Independent Directors as proxy measures of board busyness, we 
find that with every incremental addition of a busy director to the board, the cost of debt 
steadily and consistently decreases.  Further, we find that having at least four busy 
directors, or at least three busy independent directors on board significantly decreases the 
firm’s cost of debt. 
 To test Hypothesis 2 in a multivariate setting, we employ a series of OLS 
regressions based on the model in Equation 1 introduced in Section 3.1.  We include year 
and industry dummy variables to control for possible time and industry effects. 
 Based on the OLS results presented in Table 5, we find that greater board 
busyness is associated with a lower cost of debt, even after controlling for other board 
composition, loan, and borrower characteristics.  This finding is consistent with the 
concept that lenders recognize firms with busy directors as safer investments, and are 
thus willing to lend funds at a lower rate (e.g., Cremers et al., 2007; Klock et al., 2005; 
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Shivdasani, 1993).  Economically, the # of Busy Directors coefficient indicates that for 
every additional busy director on the board, the cost of debt is reduced by about 4.42 
basis points, which translates into 17.68 points lower for firms with four busy directors as 
compared to those with no busy directors.  In addition, the cost of debt for firms whose 
board is comprised of 40% busy directors is 10.31 basis points lower compared to those 
comprised of the average 25% busy directors.  We find similar economical effects for 
board busyness variables restricted to busy directors who are also independent. Based on 
these results, we conclude that board busyness has a negative and statistically significant 
effect on firms’ cost of debt, thus supporting Hypothesis 2. 
 
5.  Sensitivity and Robustness Checks 
 Our analyses assume that the specifications and proxies used effectively measure 
the appropriate attributes.  As such, to ensure that our findings are not incidental, we 
perform additional procedures to test for sensitivities and robustness of our results.  
Similar to other research works, such as Anderson et al. (2004), we review for serial 
correlation, test for non-linearities, and truncate outliers and influential observations.  We 
find that our results are robust to these various alternative specifications. 
 In addition, we retest the Poisson likelihood estimation models presented in Table 
3 using ordered-Probit and ordered-Logit estimates.  We perform these tests in order to 
compare our Poisson results to other acceptable statistical methods (for discrete and 
ordered dependent variables, such as the takeover vulnerability index), and to determine 
if any major deviations exist that may indicate problems with our models.  The estimates 
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using Probit and Logit regressions yield results that are comparable to those presented in 
Table 3. 
 Finally, to address any potential endogeneity issues in our study, we use the 
exogenous instrumental variables approach to test board structure variables in a two-stage 
least squares model.  Since Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) warn that board of directors 
variables are likely to be endogenous, we treat all of our significant board characteristics 
variables (board busyness, board independence, and board size) as suspects.  The 
approach requires an instrument for each board characteristic variable that is related to 
the suspected endogenous variable, but unrelated to the error terms of the dependent 
variable (Wooldridge, 2012).  However, identifying instruments that meet those criteria 
for each board quality variable is challenging. Following a method used by Fields et al. 
(2012), we develop a new variable – board quality index – by assigning point values to 
each of our board quality variable.  Specifically, a value of 1 is assigned to the variable if 
it is above its cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise.  The resulting board quality index 
has a range from 0 to 3. 
 Consistent with Fields et al. (2012), we use the distance between the corporate 
headquarters of the borrowing firm and the nearest medium or larger airport as an 
instrument for the board quality index variable.  According to Alam, Chen, Ciccotello, 
and Ryan (2014) and Knyazeva, Knyazeva, and Masulis (2013), the distance between 
headquarters and the nearest airport hub is a measure of the cost to a potential director in 
terms of time and effort required to travel to board meetings.  Thus, the distance variable 
is expected to have an inverse relationship with the borrower’s board quality index.  In 
the first stage of our two-stage least squares model, the distance variable is statistically 
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significant at below the 1% level, with a coefficient of -0.03010 and standard error 
0.007761.  Therefore, we proceed to the second stage of the model, which we report in 
Table 6.  The results indicate that the board quality index coefficient has a negative and 
statistically significant effect on loan spread.  Therefore, we conclude that our analyses in 
this study are not significantly affected by endogeneity. 
 
6.  Summary and Conclusion 
 The main purpose of this study is to investigate the effect that board busyness has 
on a firm’s cost of debt.  Extant literature presents mixed results on the possible avenues 
of how lenders may view firms with busy directors on the board.  Specifically, studies 
such as Core et al. (1999) and Fich and Shivdasani (2006) suggest that busy directors are 
overextended and make poor monitors of the firm’s management, thus leading to worse 
firm performance than firms whose boards are not busy.  Conversely, other studies such 
as Bradley and Chen (2011), Chakravarty et al. (2011), and Field et al. (2013) argue that 
under certain conditions (e.g., the presence of institutional voids, IPO firms, and properly 
aligned self-serving motives), firms with busy directors actually receive more benefits 
than firms without busy directors.  Therefore, using takeover vulnerability68 as the 
setting, we examine how board busyness affects firms’ cost of debt. 
 First, we test the relationship between board busyness and takeover vulnerability 
to ensure that the relationship holds when using an ex-ante proxy measure for the 
likelihood of a takeover.  Based on our analyses, we find that board busyness has an 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
68We choose takeover vulnerability because in the event of a takeover, both busy directors and lenders are 
likely to be negatively impacts.  Specifically, busy directors are likely to experience a dampened 
directorship reputation that can lead to loss of profitable directorships, and lenders are likely to suffer from 
increased credit risk. 
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inverse relationship with takeover vulnerability.  Therefore, the greater the board 
busyness, the lower the firm’s takeover vulnerability index score.  This finding is 
consistent with the concept that although busy directors may not be the most diligent 
monitors of the firm’s management, they are protective of their self-interests, such as 
shielding their directorship reputation and protecting existing and future directorship 
appointments. 
 After establishing the negative relationship between board busyness and takeover 
vulnerability index, we test the impact of board busyness on firms’ cost of debt, after 
controlling for takeover vulnerability and other factors.  We find that, as expected, board 
busyness has a negative relationship with cost of debt.  Specifically, firms with busy 
directors exhibit both statistically and economically lower cost of debt.  This finding is 
also consistent with prior literature that states the interests of lenders and shareholders are 
not always congruent (Bradley & Chen, 2011; Chava et al., 2009).  Therefore, even 
though shareholders typically benefit from takeovers, since both lenders and busy 
directors share the common objective of avoiding takeovers, lenders tend to offer lending 
agreements with lower cost of debt provisions to firms with busy directors. 
 The results of this study demonstrate that although board busyness received a 
great deal of unfavorable publicity in recent literature69 due to lower firm performance 
indicators, busy directors are beneficial to their firms.  Therefore, future research should 
further expand on the additional benefits that busy directors bring to their firms.  By 
taking a modest step toward a more comprehensive understanding of board busyness, it is 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
69 See, for example, Core, Holthausen, and Larker (1999), Fich and Shivdasani (2006), Jiraporn, Kim, and 
Davidson (2008) and Shivdasani and Yermack (1999). 
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our hope that business practitioners, regulators, and academics gain a clearer picture on 
how to balance the positive and negative attributes of busy directors to achieve harmony 





Descriptive Statistics for Variable Measures 
Variables Mean Median SD Min Max 
Board Characteristics:      
Board size 9.81 10.00 2.51 3.00 20.00 
# of directorships per director 1.96 1.88 0.65 1.00 5.79 
# of busy directors 2.68 2.00 2.36 0.00 12.00 
% of busy directors 25.89% 22.22% 20.90% 0.00% 100.00% 
% of busy boards 15.82% --- --- --- --- 
# of busy independent directors 2.15 2.00 2.00 0.00 11.00 
% of busy independent 
directors 29.03% 25.00% 23.98% 0.00% 100.00% 
% of busy independent boards 15.31% --- --- --- --- 
# of independent directors 6.80 7.00 2.50 0.00 16.00 
% of independent directors 68.72% 71.43% 17.18% 0.00% 100.00% 
% of independent boards 88.22% --- --- --- --- 
Directors’ service tenure  9.72 9.25 3.69 0.00 33.00 
Age of directors 59.67 59.91 3.64 39.17 74.43 
Takeover vulnerability 14.37 14.00 2.52 7.00 21.00 
Democracy portfolio 4.99% --- --- --- --- 
Dictatorship portfolio 5.97% --- --- --- --- 
Loan Characteristics:      
Cost of Debt (basis points) 106.01 75.00 91.97 8.50 1,000.00 
Number of financial covenants 0.27 0.00 0.61 0.00 5.00 
Credit rating score 4.03 4.00 1.05 1.00 7.00 
Maturity (months) 40.64 42.00 22.59 1.00 174.00 
Number of lenders 10.76 9.00 8.45 1.00 118.00 
Percentage of secured loans  41.39% --- --- --- --- 
Loan amount / Assets 0.31 0.10 7.45 0.00 424.80 
Borrower Characteristics:      
Market capitalization (in 
millions) $11,153 $2,622 $31,817 $0.00 $481,415 
Total Assets (in millions) $11,049 $2,861 $36,246 $1.02 $704,620 
Book leverage 0.59 0.59 0.18 0.05 2.25 
Market-to-Book ratio 1.89 1.49 1.56 0.40 44.41 
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Endogeneity Robustness Check 
Parameter Cost of Debt 
Intercept 6.4055*** 
(0.1721) 
Board Quality Index -0.8609*** 
(0.2676) 
Takeover Vulnerability Index -0.0417** 
(0.0163) 
LN(Market Capitalization) -0.2111*** 
(0.0069) 
Book Leverage 1.1595*** 
(0.2459) 
Debt Maturity -0.0021*** 
(0.0004) 
Earnings to Assets Ratio -4.4257*** 
(1.0651) 
Dummy:  Investment Grade -0.7064*** 
(0.0552) 
  
Year Dummies Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes 
Adjusted R2 62.44% 
N 2,964 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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